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Abstract
Trapdoors are a two-face key concept in modern cryptography. They are primarily related
to the concept of trapdoor function used in asymmetric cryptography. A trapdoor function
is a one-to-one mapping that is easy to compute, but for which its inverse function is
difficult to compute without special information, called the trapdoor. It is a necessary
condition to get reversibility between the sender and the receiver for encryption or
between the signer and the verifier for digital signature. The trapdoor mechanism is
always fully public and detailed. The second concept of trapdoor relates to the more subtle
and perverse concept of mathematical backdoor, which is a key issue in symmetric cryp-
tography. In this case, the aim is to insert hidden mathematical weaknesses, which enable
one who knows them to break the cipher. Therefore, the existence of a backdoor is a
strongly undesirable property. This book deals with this second concept and is focused
on block ciphers or, more specifically, on substitution-permutation networks (SPN).
Inserting a backdoor in an encryption algorithm gives an effective cryptanalysis of the
cipher to the designer.
Keywords: cryptography, block ciphers, backdoor, trapdoor, substitution-permutation
network, cryptanalysis
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Preface
1. Introduction
Despite the fact that in the late 90s/early 2000s, citizens have partially obtained the freedom for
using cryptography, the recent years have shown that more than ever, governments and intelli-
gence agencies still try to control and bypass the cryptographic means used for the protection of
data and of private life. Snowden leaks have been a first upheaval. A tremendous number of
secret projects conducted by NSA and GCHQ have been revealed to the public opinion. They
have shed a new light on the permanent attempt to control the use of cryptography by a growing
number of governments.
The recurring approaches and attempts consist in making the implementation of backdoors
mandatory. The simplest and naive approach consists in enforcing key escrowing at the opera-
tors’ level. But point-to-point encryption solutions like telegram, signal or proton mail enable to
prevent it. A number of different backdoor techniques are regularly mentioned or proposed.
The most critical aspect in embedding backdoors lies on the fact that hackers or analysts may
find them more or less easily and worse may exploit them. This is the reason why operators or
developers are very reluctant to accept backdoors until now. In case of leak, they inevitably
lose users’ confidence and favor the development of trusted services abroad. In fact, the
backdoor issue arises due to the fact that only implementation backdoors (at the protocol/
implementation/management level) are generally considered.
In this book, we address the most critical issue of backdoors: mathematical or by-design back-
doors. In other words, the backdoor is put directly in the mathematical design of the encryption
algorithm. While the algorithm is totally public, proving that there is a backdoor, identifying it
and exploiting it, is generally an intractable problem, unless you know the backdoor [1]. To some
extent, the RSA’s Dual_EC_DRBG standard case falls within this category [2]. Other nonpublic
examples are known within the military cryptanalysis community and partially revealed to the
public, thanks to the 1995 Hans Buehler case [3]. This kind of backdoor is the most difficult one
to address and there is quite no public work on that topic. It is generally the technical realm of a
few among the most eminent intelligence agencies, namely NSA and GCHQ, which moreover
have the ability and power to step in and to influence the international standardization pro-
cesses. Our objective is to explain that it is probably possible to design and put such backdoors.
In this book, we consider a particular case among many other possibilities of trapdoors.
This book is organized as follows. In the next section, we explore the concept of backdoors and
trapdoors and we identify two main categories. We also present the state-of-the-art, history
and previous work regarding backdoors, mostly in symmetric cryptography. The rest of this
book focuses on substitution-permutation networks (or SPN for short) which are a special class
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of block encryption systems, mapping a partition of the plaintexts to a partition of the cipher-
texts, independently of the round keys used.
Chapter 2 explores the concept of linear partitions and their relationships with substitution-
permutation networks. We show in Section 2 that in our case, the study of the full cipher can be
restricted to the substitution layer without loss of generality. Then in Section 3, we explore this
latter primitive and show that the problem can be restricted further to the study of a single S-box.
In Chapter 3, we discuss how to design a suitable S-box which preserves a linear partition and,
at the same time, which resists linear and differential cryptanalysis. From those theoretical
results, we have designed a full AES-like encryption system, called BEA-1, presented in
Chapter 4. Section 1 gives the full specifications of this cipher. Then Section 2 deals with the
design of its backdoor. In Section 3, we sketch the basic ideas underlying the BEA-1 cryptanal-
ysis while in Section 4, we present our cryptanalysis of BEA-1 under the assumption we have
the full knowledge of the backdoor.
Chapter 5 concludes this book and explore new ideas and trends in encryption backdoors. The
full description of cryptographic primitives used in BEA-1 is given in Appendix.
2. The concept of backdoor
2.1. Definition and classification proposal
Trapdoors are a two-face key concept in modern cryptography. They are primarily related to
the concept of trapdoor function used in asymmetric cryptography. A trapdoor function is a one-
to-one mapping that is easy to compute, but for which its inverse function is difficult to
compute without special information, called the trapdoor. It is a necessary condition to get
reversibility between the sender and the receiver for encryption or between the signer and the
verifier for digital signature. The trapdoor mechanism is always fully public and detailed. The
security and the core principle are based on the existence of a secret information, the private
key, which is essentially part of the trapdoor. In other words, the private key can be seen as the
trapdoor.
The second concept of trapdoor relates to the more subtle and perverse concept of mathematical
backdoor, which is a key issue in symmetric cryptography. In this case, the aim is to insert
hidden mathematical weaknesses which enable one who knows them to break the cipher.
Nonetheless, mathematical backdoors may be extended to asymmetric cryptography, see for
example the case of the DUAL EC_DRBG [2], or the case of trapdoor primes addresses recently
in [4]. Therefore, the existence of a backdoor is a strongly undesirable property.
In the rest of this section, we will oppose the term of trapdoor, the desirable property, to that of
backdoor, the undesirable one. While the term of trapdoor has been already used in the very
few literature covering the second face of this problem, we suggest however to use the term of
backdoor to describe the issue of hidden mathematical weaknesses. This would avoid ambi-
guity and maybe would favor the research work around a topic which is nowadays mostly
addressed by governmental entities in the context of cryptography control and regulations.
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Inserting backdoors in encryption algorithms underlies quite systematically the choice of
cryptographic standards (DES, AES…). The reason is that the testing, validation and selection
processes are always conducted by governmental entities (NIST or equivalent) with the tech-
nical support of secret entities (NSA or equivalent). So an interesting and critical research area
is: “how easy and feasible is it to design and to insert backdoors in encryption algorithms?”. In
this book, we intend to address one very particular case of this question. It is important to keep
in mind that a backdoor may be itself defined in the following two ways.
• As a “natural weakness” known, but none disclosed, only by the tester, validator or final
decision-maker. The best historic example is that of the differential cryptanalysis. Follow-
ing Biham and Shamir’s seminal work in 1991 [5], NSA acknowledged that it was aware of
that cryptanalysis years ago [6]. Most of experts estimate that it was nearly 20 years ahead.
However a number of non public, commercial block ciphers in the early 90s might have
been be weak with respect to differential cryptanalysis.
• As an intended design weakness put by the author of the algorithm. To the authors
knowledge, there is no known case for public algorithms yet.
As far as symmetric cryptography is concerned, there are two major families of cipher systems
for which the issue of backdoor must be considered differently.
• Stream ciphers. Their design complexity is rather low since they mostly rely on algebraic
primitives: LFSRs and Boolean functions which have intensely been studied in the open
literature Until the late 70s, backdoors relied on the fact that quite all algorithms were propri-
etary and hence secret. It was then easy to hide nonprimitive polynomials, weak-combining
Boolean functions… The Hans Buehler case in 1995 [3] shed light on that particular case.
• Block ciphers. This class of encryption algorithms is rather recent (end of the 70s for the
public part). They exhibit so a huge combinatorial complexity that it is reasonable to think
to backdoors. As described in [7] for a κ-bit secret key and an m-bit input/output block
cipher there are ðð2mÞ!Þ2
κ
possible such block ciphers. For such an algorithm, the number
of possible internal states is so huge that we are condemned to have only a local view of
the system, that is, the round function or the basic cryptographic primitives. We cannot be
sure that there is no degeneration effect at a higher level. This point has been addressed
in [7] when considering linear cryptanalysis. Therefore, it seems reasonable to think that
this combinatorial richness of block ciphers may be used to hide backdoors.
Since block ciphers are now the most widely used encryption algorithms by the general public
and the industry, we will focus on them in the rest of this book. Backdoors in stream ciphers
have quite never been exposed to the public.
2.2. Previous work
Regarding the previous work, we can consider two aspects. The first one relates to authors
who have considered structures on the input and output spaces of round functions to build
key distinguishing or key recovery attacks. In this case, it is possible to suppose that those
structures are “natural” structures. The second case is directly linked to the topic covered in
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this book. It relates to the design of backdoors based on such structures. Exploiting these
hidden structures then leads to a tractable cryptanalysis. In this respect, we can see those
structures as “intended” and no longer “natural”.
2.2.1. Attacks using space structures
Among the very first previous works that have considered structures in the plaintext and
ciphertext spaces is the contribution of Evertse [8]. This paper introduced the linear structures
for block ciphers, which map a subspace of Fm2  F
κ
2 (the product of the plaintext and ciphertext
spaces) onto a subspace of Fm2 (the ciphertext space). Then, the author showed that if such a
linear structure exists, then known-plaintext and chosen-plaintext attacks faster than exhaus-
tive search are possible.
Later, Leander et al. [9] developed a new cryptanalysis, called invariant subspace attack, breaking
the PRINTCIPHER [10] for a significant fraction of its keys. The general idea of this attack can be
outlined as follows. Let F denote the SP-layer of a substitution-permutation network, that is, the
round function without the key addition. Then, assume that Fmaps a coset of a given subspace V
to another coset of V. In other words, there exist a and b such that Fðaþ VÞ ¼ bþ V . Here, the
addition is made in Fn2 and hence corresponds with the XOR operation. The round function
associated with the round key k is then defined by Fk : x↦Fðxþ kÞ. If the round key k belongs to
the coset a + b + V, then it holds that
Fkðbþ VÞ ¼ Fðbþ kþ VÞ ¼ Fðaþ VÞ ¼ bþ V ,
hence the name of invariant subspace. Therefore, if every round key lies in this particular coset, the
affine subspace b + V is preserved by the full encryption process. Such a property enables a very
efficient distinguisher. As additional results, they also showed that the invariant subspace attack
• implies a truncated differential attack to be possible (the probability of the truncated
differential characteristic is however highly key-dependent);
• implies the existence of strongly biased linear approximations for weak keys (indepen-
dently of the number of rounds).
This attack has been generalized in 2015 by Leander et al. [11]. They proposed a generic
algorithm that is able to detect invariant subspaces. Indeed, their initial invariant subspaces
on PRINTCIPHER were found empirically.
Following the idea of the invariant subspace attack, Grassi et al. [12] introduced the subspace
trail cryptanalysis. Given r + 1 subspaces V ½0,…, V ½r, it is assumed that the image of any coset of
V[i] under the SP-network is included in a coset of V[i+1]. That is to say, for each a[i], there exists
a[i+1] such the following inclusion holds
Fða½i þ V ½iÞ⊆ a½iþ1 þ V ½iþ1 :
In this case, it is easy to see the all round functions Fk inherit such a property. The family of
subspaces ðV ½iÞi ≤ r is said to be a subspace trail. Naturally, the dimension of V
[i] must be lower
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than or equal to the dimension of V[i+1]. In contrast to the invariant subspace attack, Grassi
et al. relaxed the assumption that the coset has to be invariant. Here, the considered subset
becomes the coset of possibly different increasingly dimensional subspaces throughout the
encryption. However, the authors also required this property to hold for each coset of V[0]
instead of one. Therefore, this cryptanalysis is not a generalization but a variation of the
invariant subspace attack. As will become clear in Section 2 of Chapter 2, the family of
backdoors covered in this book is closely related to constant-dimensional subspace trails.
Let us mention that in [13], the authors introduced nonlinear invariant subspaces by consider-
ing a general Boolean function g such that gðFðxÞÞ⊕ gðxÞ is constant. Finally, Table 1.1 summa-
rized the structures considered by the attacks presented in this section and compared it with
our work.
2.2.2. Backdoor design and structures
One of the first trapdoor ciphers was created in 1997 by Rijmen and Preneel [14]. Their S-boxes
are constructed to have one high correlation between the zero mapping and a sum of certain
output bits. The knowledge of this correlation yields a high potential linear trail which is used
to recover a part of the key with linear cryptanalysis. Such a weakness is generally pointed out
by the first line of the S-boxes’ correlation matrices. Yet, if the output size of the S-boxes is large
enough, their computation is too expensive. Relying on this fact, the authors claimed that their
trapdoor is undetectable, even if one knows its global design. Nevertheless, Wu et al. [15]
disproved this by discovering a way to recover the trapdoor. It is worthwhile to mention that
in practice, if a real cipher containing a trapdoor is given, the presence of the trapdoor will
certainly not be revealed.
More recently in [16], the authors created non-surjective S-boxes embedding a parity check to
create a trapdoor cipher. The message space is thus divided into cosets and leads to create an
attack on this DES-like cipher in less than 223 operations. The security of the whole algorithm,
particularly against linear and differential cryptanalysis is not given and the authors admit
that their attack is dependent on the first and last permutation of the cipher. Finally, the non-
surjective S-boxes may lead to detect easily the trapdoor by simply calculating the image of
each input vector. This problem is naturally avoided in a substitution-permutation network in
which S-boxes are bijective by definition.
Our approach is mainly a generalization of the ideas presented by Paterson in [17]. In this
article, a DES-like trapdoor cipher exploiting a weakness induced by the round functions is
Work Structure Key dependence
Evertse [8] Linear structure (if any) Key independent
Leander et al. [9, 11] Exact coset Round key dependent
Grassi et al. [12] Coset independent Round key independent
Our approach Coset independent Round key independent
Table 1.1. Comparison of existing work with respect to input and output space structures.
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presented. The group generated by the round functions acts imprimitively on the message
space. In other words, the round function preserves a partition of the message space no matter
the round key used, and hence, the same applies to the full cipher. This partition forms the
trapdoor. Paterson then introduced a trapdoor cipher composed of 32 rounds and using an 80-
bit key. The trapdoor enables recovery of the key using 241 operations and 232 chosen plain-
texts. Even if the mathematical material to build the trapdoor is given, no general algorithm
details the S-boxes’ construction. Furthermore, as the author says, S-boxes using these princi-
ples are incomplete: half of the ciphertext bits are independent of half of the plaintext bits.
Finally, the security against a differential attack is said to be not as high as one might expect.
Moreover, the author wondered whether the partition of the message space had to be linear,
that is to say, made up with every coset of a linear subspace. Caranti et al. [18] provided a first
answer to Paterson’s question, by proving that if the group generated by the round functions is
imprimitive, then the partition of the message space must be linear. In his thesis [19], Harpes
considered trapdoor ciphers mapping a partition of the plaintexts to a partition of the cipher-
texts. As these partitions are not necessarily equal, this family generalizes Paterson’s one.
Harpes suggested using this trapdoor with its partitioning cryptanalysis.
Partition-Based Trapdoor Ciphers
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Partition-Based Trapdoor Cipher
This chapter intends to study Substitution-Permutation Networks mapping a partition of the
plaintexts to a partition of the ciphertexts, independently of the round keys used. All the
results of this and the following chapters comes from [20].
1. Linear partitions
Let us begin with some notations and conventions.
Notation 2.1. Let m and n denote positive integers. For two maps f and g, the composition g ∘ f
(or simply gf) denotes the evaluation of f followed by g. For any set E, let #E denotes its
cardinality. If F is a subset of E, Fc denotes its complement.
Let us denote the Galois field of order two by F2 and 0n ¼ ð0;…,0 Þ the zero vector of F
n
2 . All the
vector spaces considered in this chapter are over the finite field F2. It is worthwhile to mention
that ðFn2Þ
m will be often identified with Fnm2 . The concatenation of two vectors x and y is denoted
by (x || y).
An n-bit S-box is any permutation of Fn2 . If x and y are two elements of F
n
2 , then 〈x, y〉 ¼
Pn1
i¼0 xiyi.
If L : Fn2 ! F
m
2 is a linear map, define L
⊺
: F
m
2 ! F
n
2 by 〈L
⊺ðxÞ, y〉 ¼ 〈x, LðyÞ〉 for every
ðx, yÞ∈Fn2  F
m
2 . In other words, L
⊺ is the transpose of L for the bilinear form 〈  ,  〉.
Finally, we will denote the elements of Fn2 using the hexadecimal notation. For instance, the
element ð1; 0; 1; 1; 1Þ of F52 is denoted by 17.
Since we are concerned with ciphers that associate a partition of the ciphertext space to another
partition of the plaintext space, let us introduce the following definition.
Definition 2.2. Let f be a permutation of E and A, B be two partitions of E. Let f ðAÞ denote the
set {f ðAÞjA∈A}. We say that f maps A to B if f ðAÞ ¼ B. If A ¼ B, we says that f preserves the
partition A.
The two partitions {{x} j x∈E} and {E} are called the trivial partitions of E. Observe that, for any
permutation f of E,
f ð{{x} j x∈E}Þ ¼ {{x} j x∈E} and f ð{E}Þ ¼ {E} :
That is, every permutation preserves the two trivial partitions. Moreover it should be
highlighted that if fmaps A to B and if A is nontrivial, then so is B.
Example 2.3. Let E denote the set ½½0, 8½½ and consider the two partitions A, B of E defined by
A ¼ {{0; 1; 4}, {2; 6}, {3; 7}, {5}} and B ¼ {{0; 2; 7}, {1}, {3; 5}, {4; 6}}. Let f be the permutation of E
defined by
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0↦ 7 , 1↦ 0 , 2↦ 3 , 3↦ 6 , 4↦ 2 , 5↦ 1 , 6↦ 5 , 7↦ 4 :
By definition,
f ðAÞ ¼ { f ðAÞjA∈A} ¼ { f ð{0, 1, 4}Þ, f ð{2, 6}Þ, f ð{3, 7}Þ, f ð{5}Þ}
¼ { {7, 0, 2}, {3, 5}, {6, 4}, {1} }:
The equality f ðAÞ ¼ B holds, and thus fmaps the partition A to B. ▴
Lemma 2.4. Let f be a permutation of E and A, B be two partitions of E. If for any part A of A,
f(A) is a part of B, then fmaps A to B.
In this chapter, we will consider a special kind of partitions that is composed of all the cosets of
a linear subspace. Such partitions have already been introduced by [19, Definition 4.4] and are
recalled below.
Definition 2.5 (linear partition). Let A be a partition of Fn2 . Let V denote its part containing 0n.
The partition A is said to be linear if V is a subspace of Fn2 and if every part ofA is a coset of V in
F
n
2 , in other words, if
A ¼ {xþ Vjx∈Fn2} ¼ F
n
2=V :
We denote LðVÞ such a partition.
Remark 2.6. It turns out that the linear partitions associated with the two trivial subspaces of
F
n
2 , that is {0n} and F
n
2 , correspond with the two trivial partitions of F
n
2 . Moreover, if V is a
nontrivial subspace of Fn2 , then the linear partition LðVÞ is also nontrivial.
Example 2.7. Consider the subspaces V andW of F52 defined by
V ¼ spanð07,1AÞ ¼ {00,07,1A,1D} and W ¼ spanð0E,12Þ ¼ {00,0E,12,1C} :
Since both V andW are two-dimensional subspaces of F52, the quotient spaces LðVÞ ¼ F
5
2=V and
LðWÞ ¼ F52=W are three-dimensional. In other words, the two linear partitions LðVÞ and LðWÞ
have 23 = 8 parts. It can be verified that
LðVÞ ¼ {V,01þ V,02þ V, 03þ V,08þ V,09þ V,0Aþ V,0Bþ V},
LðWÞ ¼ {W,01þW,02þW,03þW,04þW,05þW,06þW,07þW}:
For instance, the part 0B + V of the linear partition LðVÞ is the coset of V with respect to 0B.
Explicitly, it is equal to
0Bþ V ¼ {0Bþ 00,0Bþ 07,0Bþ 1A,0Bþ 1D} ¼ {0B,0C,11,16} :
Now, consider the permutation f of F52 given in Figure 2.1. The image of 0B + V under f is
f ð0Bþ VÞ ¼ f ð{0B,0C,11,16}Þ ¼ {0D,03,11,1F}
¼ {03þ 0E,03þ 00,03þ 12,03þ 1F} ¼ 03þW :
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Observe that f ð0Bþ VÞ is a coset of W so a part of LðWÞ. The images of all cosets of V under f
are displayed in Figure 2.2. Since any of them is a part of LðWÞ, the permutation f maps LðVÞ
to LðWÞ. It is worthwhile to observe that a permutation mapping a linear partition to another
one does not need to be itself linear or even affine. Indeed, f is certainly not linear as
f ð00Þ ¼ 1E 6¼ 00. By contradiction, suppose that f is an affine transformation. Then, there exist
a linear mapping L : F52 ! F
5
2 and an element c of F
5
2 such that f ðxÞ ¼ LðxÞ þ c holds for all x in
F
5
2. Therefore,
f ðxÞ þ f ðyÞ þ f ðzÞ ¼ LðxÞ þ cþ LðyÞ þ cþ LðzÞ þ c ¼ Lðxþ yþ zÞ þ c ¼ f ðxþ yþ zÞ
for all x, y and z in F52. Observe that
f ð00Þ þ f ð01Þ þ f ð02Þ ¼ 1Eþ 08þ 04 ¼ 12 6¼ 13 ¼ f ð00þ 01þ 02Þ :
Thus, f is not an affine transformation. ▴
Lemma 2.8. Let V, W be two subspaces of Fn2 and f be a permutation of F
n
2 , which maps LðVÞ to
LðWÞ. For any x in Fn2 , fmaps x + V to f(x) +W.
Example 2.9. In Example 2.7, we have seen that f ð0Bþ VÞ ¼ 03þW . Since f maps LðVÞ to
LðWÞ, the previous lemma states that f ð0Bþ VÞ ¼ f ð0BÞ þW ¼ 0DþW . There is however no
contradiction here because 0D belongs to 03 + W. Consequently, the cosets 03 + W and 0D + W
are equal. ▴
The following two propositions are interesting properties of linear partitions, which will be
used in the rest of this chapter.
Proposition 2.10. Let V1, V2,W1,W2 be four subspaces of F
n
2 and f be a permutation of F
n
2 ,
which maps LðV1Þ to LðW1Þ and LðV2Þ to LðW2Þ. Then fmaps LðV1 ∩V2Þ to LðW1 ∩W2Þ.
Figure 2.1. The permutation f of Example 2.7.
Figure 2.2. The permutation fmapping LðVÞ to LðWÞ where V ¼ spanð07,1AÞ andW ¼ spanð0E,12Þ.
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Proposition 2.11. Let V, W be two subspaces of Fn2 and f be a permutation of F
n
2 , which maps
LðVÞ to LðWÞ. There exists an automorphism L of Fn2 such that LðVÞ ¼ W . In particular, V and
W are isomorphic.
Example 2.12. Consider again the permutation f of F52 defined in Figure 2.8. As seen in the
previous example, the permutation maps the linear partition LðVÞ to LðWÞ. Then, Proposition
2.11 ensures that there exists a linear permutation L of F52 such that L(V) =W. Consider the bases
(07,1A) and (0E,12) of V andW respectively and complete them into the following bases of F52
BV ¼ ðviÞi<5 ¼ ð07,1A,01,02,08Þ and BW ¼ ðwiÞi<5 ¼ ð0E,12,01,02,04Þ :
Then, the mapping L can be defined by L(vi) = wi for each i < 5. This linear transformation will
be used in the next chapter. ▴
2. Substitution-permutation networks and partitions
This section aims at studying an SPN, which maps a partition of the plaintexts to a partition of
the ciphertexts. When the cipher key K is fixed, the encryption function EK is just a permutation
of the message space. Therefore, any partition A of the plaintexts is mapped to the partition
EKðAÞ of the ciphertexts. Nonetheless, to exploit the trapdoor, the designer needs to know the
pair of partitions ðA, EKðAÞÞ. The problem is that the output partition EKðAÞ depends a priori
on the cipher key K, which is unknown to the attacker. The simplest way to solve this problem
is to require the partition EKðAÞ to be independent of the cipher key K. In other words, we
want all the partitions EKðAÞ to be equal to a fixed partition B.
As with differential and linear cryptanalysis, taking account of the exact effect of the key
schedule seems to be a challenging problem. Therefore, the key schedule will deliberately be
omitted throughout this chapter. This amounts to consider an SPN mapping a partition A to a
fixed partition B, independently of the round keys used.
2.1. The key addition and diffusion layer
Substitution-permutation networks belong to the class of iterated block ciphers. As every
iterated block cipher, the encryption function consists in applying a simple keyed operation
called round function several times. A different round key is used for each iteration of the round
function. In practice, these rounds keys are extracted from a master key using an algorithm
called key schedule. In an SPN, the round function is made up of three distinct stages: a key
addition, a substitution layer and a permutation or diffusion layer. The substitution layer consists of
the parallel evaluation of several S-boxes and is the only part of the cipher, which is not linear
or affine. Then, the diffusion layer is the evaluation of some linear mappings (generally one).
Before tackling the full cipher, we look at its basic operations and primitives. The attacker
knows the specifications of the substitution and diffusion layers, but he does not know the
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round key used in the key addition. Therefore, the key addition should not be considered as
one operation but rather as a family of permutations. To get back to the subject at hand, we
must first determine the partitions A, which are mapped to a unique partition under the action
of all round keys.
The next proposition explains the fundamental property of linear partitions according to the
key addition. This result was introduced by Harpes in [19]. Later, Caranti et al. gave a similar
result expressed for imprimitive groups in [18]. For convenience, we restate this result with our
own notations.
Proposition 2.13. Let n be a positive integer. Let A and B be two partitions of Fn2 . For each k in
F
n
2 , let αk denote the permutation of F
n
2 defined by αkðxÞ ¼ xþ k. Then, the permutation αk
maps A to B for any k in Fn2 if and only if A ¼ B and A is a linear partition.
Even if this result was easily obtained, it has maybe the most important impact on our study.
Due to this result and its generalization given later in the next section, only linear partitions
will be considered. By definition, the linear partitions are quotient spaces and hence highly
structured algebraic objects. Consequently, the apparent combinatorial aspect of our study is
reduced to an algebraic problem. This result is indeed quite restrictive since the linear parti-
tions account for a small proportion of all partitions.
Example 2.14. Let n and k be nonnegative integers and q be a prime power. The q-binomial (or
Gaussian) coefficient is defined by
n
d
 
q
¼
Yd
i¼1
1 qniþ1
1 qi
:
It can be proved that this coefficient counts the number of d-dimensional subspaces of an n-
dimensional vector space over the finite field Fq. Therefore, the number of subspaces of F
3
2 is
given by
X3
d¼0
3
d
 
2
¼ 1þ
1 23
1 2
þ
ð1 23Þð1 22Þ
ð1 2Þð1 22Þ
þ
ð1 23Þð1 22Þð1 21Þ
ð1 2Þð1 22Þð1 23Þ
¼ 1þ 7þ 7þ 1 ¼ 16 :
Since a linear partition of F32 is uniquely determined by a subspace of F
3
2, there are exactly 16
linear partitions. All these partitions are represented graphically at the top of Figure 2.3. For
instance, the linear partition associated with the subspace spanð2,4Þ ¼ {0,2,4,6} is
Lðspanð2,4ÞÞ ¼ {{0,2,4,6}, {1,3,5,7}}.
Proposition 2.13 states that among the set of all the partitions of Fn2 , only the linear ones yield a
unique output partition for every key. The Bell number Bm counts the number of partitions of a
set of size m. Thus, the number of partitions of Fn2 is B2n . For n = 3, there are B8 = 4140 partitions
in all. Hence, the linear partitions represent a fraction of 16/B8 ≈ 2
8.0. This ratio falls greatly as
n increases. In fact, for n = 4, only 67/B16 ≈ 2
27.2 are linear and for n = 5, this ratio becomes 374/
B32 ≈ 2
78.2. This underlines how Proposition 2.13 is restrictive.
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Figure 2.3. Every linear partitions and key addition in F32.
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All the key additions are given at the bottom of Figure 2.3. The reverse implication of Propo-
sition 2.13 states that any linear partition is preserved by all the key additions. For instance,
α2ðLðspanð6ÞÞ ¼ {f ð{0,6}Þ, f ð{1,7}Þ, f ð{2,4}Þ, f ð{3,5}Þ}
¼ { {2,4}, {3,5}, {0,6}, {1,7} } ¼ Lðspanð6ÞÞ:
Thus, the permutation α2 preserves Lðspanð6ÞÞ. Figure 2.4 illustrates graphically that this
linear partition is preserved by all the key additions. It is then not hard to check that the same
holds for every linear partition given in Figure 2.3. ▴
Now that we know linear partitions are of major importance, we focus on how the diffusion
layer deals with these partitions.
Proposition 2.15. Let n be a positive integer. Let L be an automorphism of Fn2 and V a subspace
of Fn2 . Then, LðLðVÞÞ ¼ LðLðVÞÞ. In particular, L maps a linear partition to another one.
Proof. Since L is an automorphism, we have
LðLðVÞÞ ¼ Lð{xþ Vjx∈Fn2}Þ ¼ {Lðxþ VÞjx∈F
n
2}
¼ {LðxÞ þ LðVÞjx∈Fn2} ¼ {x
0 þ LðVÞjx0 ∈Fn2} :
Moreover, L(V) is a subspace of Fn2 because L is a linear mapping. Consequently,
LðLðVÞÞ ¼ LðLðVÞÞ. ▪
If V andW are two subspaces of Fn2 , it is straightforward to design a linear permutation L of F
n
2
mapping LðVÞ to LðWÞ. Indeed, Proposition 2.15 establishes that L maps LðVÞ to LðWÞ is and
only if LðVÞ ¼ W . In other words, we only need to consider the image of V and not the whole
linear partition LðVÞ.
Figure 2.4. The key additions preserving the partition Lðspanð6ÞÞ.
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2.2. From the encryption function to the substitution layer
Along with the two results of the previous section, we can now address our main issue. For
the rest of this chapter, we consider a generic SPN whose parameters are defined as follows.
Definition 2.16 (SPN). Let m, n and r be positive integers. A substitution-permutation network is
an iterated block cipher whose encryption function is defined as follows. Let S0,…,Sm1 be n-
bit S-boxes.
• The addition of the round key k is denoted by αk : F
nm
2 ! F
nm
2 , x↦ xþ k.
• The substitution layer is denoted by σ and maps ðxiÞ0 ≤ i<m to ðSiðxiÞÞ0 ≤ i<m.
• The diffusion layer is a linear permutation denoted by pi : Fnm2 ! F
nm
2 .
The round function Fk associated with the round key k is defined by Fk ¼ piσαk. The encryption
function associated with the round keys K ¼ ðk½0,…, k½rÞ in ðFnm2 Þ
rþ1 is defined by
EK ¼ αk½rFk½r1…Fk½0 :
We can now prove the following result.
Theorem 2.17. Let A and B be two partitions of Fnm2 . Suppose for any (r + 1)-tuples of round
keys K ¼ ðk½0,…, k½rÞ in ðFnm2 Þ
rþ1 that the encryption function EK maps A to B. Define A
½0 ¼ A
and for all 1 ≤ i ≤ r, A½i ¼ ðpiσÞiðAÞ. Then,
• A
½r ¼ B;
• for any 0 ≤ i < r and for any k[i] in Fnm2 , Fk½iðA
½iÞ ¼ A½iþ1;
• for any 0 ≤ i ≤ r, A½i is a linear partition.
Proof. Observe that for the round key k = 0nm, the key addition α0nm is the identity mapping on
F
nm
2 , and thus F0nm ¼ piσα0nm ¼ piσ. Now, choosing K ¼ ðk
½0,…, k½rÞ ¼ ð0nm,…,0nmÞ gives
B ¼ EKðA
½0Þ ¼ αk½rFk½r1…Fk½0ðA
½0Þ ¼ α0nm ðF0nmÞ
rðA½0Þ
¼ ðpiσÞrðA½0Þ ¼ A½r:
Let 0 ≤ i < r be an integer. Let k[i] be any element of Fnm2 . Define k
½j¼ 0nm for all 0 ≤ j ≤ r such that
j 6¼ i. By hypothesis, the equality αk½rFk½r1…Fk½0ðA
½0Þ ¼ A½r holds. Thus,
Fk½i…Fk½0ðA
½0Þ ¼ ðαk½rFk½r1…Fk½iþ1Þ
1ðA½rÞ :
On one hand,
Fk½i…Fk½0ðA
½0Þ ¼ Fk½iðFk½i1…Fk½0ÞðA
½0Þ ¼ Fk½iðF0nm Þ
iðA½0Þ
¼ Fk½iðpiσÞ
iðA½0Þ ¼ Fk½iðA
½iÞ:
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On the other hand,
ðαk½rFk½r1…Fk½iþ1Þ
1ðA½rÞ ¼ ðα0nmðF0nmÞ
rðiþ1ÞÞ1ðA½rÞ
¼ ððpiσÞrðiþ1ÞÞ1ðA½rÞ ¼ A½iþ1:
Therefore, Fk½iðA
½iÞ ¼ A½iþ1, or equivalently αk½iðA
½iÞ ¼ ðpiσÞ1ðA½iþ1Þ. Since this equality holds
for every k[i], Proposition 2.13 states that the partition A½i is linear.
It remains to show that A½r is linear as the previous argument holds only for i < r. Let k[r] be an
element of Fnm2 . Define k
[i] = 0nm for each 0 ≤ i < r. Then,
A
½r ¼ αk½rFk½r1…Fk½0ðA
½0Þ ¼ αk½rðF0nmÞ
rðA½0Þ ¼ αk½rðA
½rÞ :
Again, Proposition 2.13 implies that A½r is linear and the result is proven. ▪
This theorem can be restated in the following way. First, the input partition A and the output
partition Bmust be linear. This result generalizes Proposition 2.13 in the sense that it applies to
the full cipher and not only to the key addition. As was pointed out earlier, linear partitions are
very specific partitions. This means that our combinatorial hypothesis implies to consider only
algebraic objects.
Second, we have only supposed that the encryption function maps A to B after r rounds.
Nevertheless, Theorem 2.17 ensures that each iteration of the round function also maps a fixed
linear partition to another one. As a consequence, the study of the full cipher is reduced to the
study of the round function. Additionally, this result can be strengthened as follows.
Corollary 2.18. Keep the notations of Theorem 2.17. For all 0 ≤ i ≤ r, let V[i] denote the part ofA½i
containing 0. According to Theorem 2.17, A½i ¼ LðV ½iÞ. Let 0 ≤ i < r be an integer. Then,
σðLðV ½iÞÞ ¼ LðW ½iÞ :
where W[i] denotes the subspace pi1ðV ½iþ1Þ. In particular, the substitution layer must at least
map one linear partition to another one.
Proof. By definition, piσðA½iÞ ¼ A½iþ1 or, equivalently, σðA½iÞ ¼ pi1ðA½iþ1Þ. This equality can
be restated as
σðLðV ½iÞÞ ¼ pi1ðLðV ½iþ1ÞÞ :
As pi is an automorphism of Fnm2 , then so pi
1 is. Next, Proposition 2.15 ensures that
pi1ðLðV ½iþ1ÞÞ ¼ Lðpi1ðV ½iþ1ÞÞ. The result follows. ▪
A diagrammatic representation of Theorem 2.17 and Corollary 2.18 is given in Figure 2.5. This
highlights that the input partition is always transformed in the same way through each basic
operation of the encryption process. The results obtained so far can be summarized as follows:
if an SPN maps a partition A of the plaintext space to a partition B of the ciphertext space no
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matter the round keys used, then the substitution layer has to map at least one linear partition
to another one. This shows that our study can be reduced to the substitution layer without loss
of generality.
3. Structure of the substitution layer
In the remainder of this chapter, V andW will denote two subspaces of ðFn2Þ
m.
As explained in the previous section, it remains to understand how the substitution layer can
map the linear partition LðVÞ to LðWÞ. This problem is far more complex for the substitution
Figure 2.5. Results of Section 2.2.
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layer than it was for the diffusion layer. The reasons for this are twofold. First, the substitution
layer is nonlinear. It is even the only part of the SPN, which is not affine. As a consequence, to
map the linear partition LðVÞ to LðWÞ, we have to consider all the parts of both partitions and
not only the subspaces V and W, as was the case for the diffusion layer (see Proposition 2.15).
Second, the substitution layer should not be considered as a whole, but as the parallel applica-
tion of its S-boxes. Therefore our problem becomes the following. Given two subspaces V and
W, what are the necessary and/or sufficient conditions on the S-boxes for the substitution layer
to map LðVÞ to LðWÞ.
Before going any further, let us introduce an example that we will continue throughout this
section.
Example 2.19. Consider the substitution layer made up of the four 5-bit S-boxes S0, S1, S2 and
S3 described in Figure 2.6. Its parameters are then m = 4 and n = 5. Observe that the S-box S2
was previously studied in Example 2.7. Define the two families EV ¼ ðviÞ0 ≤ i<7 and
EW ¼ ðwiÞ0 ≤ i<7 of elements of ðF
5
2Þ
4 by
v0 ¼ ð10,00,00,17Þ ,
v1 ¼ ð08,00,00,17Þ ,
v2 ¼ ð04,00,00,0BÞ ,
v3 ¼ ð02,00,00,1CÞ ,
v4 ¼ ð01,00,00,1CÞ ,
v5 ¼ ð00,00,1A,00Þ ,
v6 ¼ ð00,00,07,00Þ :
w0 ¼ ð10,00,00,15Þ ,
w1 ¼ ð08,00,00,1DÞ ,
w2 ¼ ð04,00,00,15Þ ,
w3 ¼ ð02,00,00,08Þ ,
w4 ¼ ð01,00,00,00Þ ,
w5 ¼ ð00,00,12,00Þ ,
w6 ¼ ð00,00,0E,00Þ :
Finally, define VandWas the subspaces spanned by EV and EW , respectively. Note that the family
EV is linearly independent because it is echelonized. Hence, EV is a basis of V. The same applies
for EW andW. As a consequence, V andW are both seven-dimensional subspaces of ðF
5
2Þ
4.
We claim that the substitution layer σ maps LðVÞ to LðWÞ. Naturally, we will not verify this
statement by hand because it requires to check for each of the 213 cosets of V that the 27 images
of its elements under σ lies in the same coset of W. However, the reader who is relectant to
accept this claim is encouraged to check it with a computer. ▴
Figure 2.6. Specification of the S-boxes used throughout Section 3.
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3.1. Truncating the substitution layer
To understand how the substitution layer can map LðVÞ to LðWÞ, we will adopt a divide and
conquer strategy. That is to say, we want to break down this problem into several independent
sub-problems, each involving less S-boxes than the full substitution layer. The first idea is to
truncate the substitution layer and the subspaces V andW to get a local view of what happens
on some S-boxes.
Definition 2.20 (truncation and substitution layer). Let E be any non-empty subset of ½½0;m½½
and define the following mappings
TE : ðF
n
2Þ
m ! ðFn2Þ
E σE : ðF
n
2Þ
E ! ðFn2Þ
E
ðxiÞ0 ≤ i<m↦ ðxiÞi∈E ðxiÞi∈E↦ ðSiðxiÞÞi∈E :
If E has cardinality p, then we identify ðFn2Þ
E with ðFn2Þ
p.
The mapping TE allows to shorten a vector of ðF
n
2Þ
m to keep only the coordinates whose indices
belong to E. The application σE is a substitution layer truncated to the S-boxes whose indices
lie in E.
Remark 2.21. Note that TE is a linear mapping. Observe that σ½½0;m½½ is the substitution layer of
the SPN. Moreover, the truncated substitution layer σ{i} and the S-box Si are equal for all
0 ≤ i < m.
Proposition 2.22 (truncating to a few S-boxes). Suppose that σmaps LðVÞ to LðWÞ. Let E be a
nonempty subset of ½½0;m½½. Then, the permutation σE maps LðTEðVÞÞ to LðTEðWÞÞ.
Proof. Let x ¼ ðxiÞi∈E be an element of ðF
n
2Þ
E. Let y be the element of ðFn2Þ
m defined by yi = xi if i
belongs to E and yi¼ 0n otherwise. Thus, TEðyÞ ¼ x. By hypothesis, σ maps LðVÞ to LðWÞ.
Hence, Lemma 2.8 implies that σðyþ VÞ ¼ σðyÞ þW . Next,
TEðσðyþ VÞÞ ¼ TEðσðyÞÞ þ TEðWÞ
since TE is a linear mapping. Furthermore,
TEðσðyþ VÞÞ ¼ TEσð{yþ vjv∈V}Þ ¼ {TEσðyþ vÞjv∈V}
¼ {σEðTEðyþ vÞÞjv∈V} ¼ σEð{TEðyþ vÞjv∈V}Þ
¼ σEð{TEðyÞ þ TEðvÞjv∈V}Þ ¼ σEðTEðyÞ þ TEðVÞÞ :
Therefore, σEðxþ TEðVÞÞ ¼ TEðσðyÞÞ þ TEðWÞ. In other words, the image of any part of
LðTEðVÞÞ under σE lies in LðTEðWÞÞ. The result is a consequence of Lemma 2.4. ▪
Example 2.23. By choosing E ¼ {0; 3}, the previous proposition ensures that the truncated
substitution layer σ{0,3} maps LðT {0,3}ðVÞÞ to LðT {0,3}ðWÞÞ. First, it is easy to see that
T{0,3}ðVÞ ¼ spanðð10,17Þ, ð08,17Þ, ð04,0BÞ, ð02,1CÞ, ð01,1CÞÞ,
T{0,3}ðWÞ ¼ spanðð10,15Þ, ð08,1DÞ, ð04,15Þ, ð02,08Þ, ð01,00ÞÞ:
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Again, we will not explicitly check that σ{0;3} maps LðT{0;3}ðVÞÞ to LðT{0;3}ðWÞÞ but limit our-
selves to prove that the coset ð07,03Þ þ T{0;3}ðVÞ is mapped to one coset of T {0;3}ðWÞ. Its image
can be found using Lemma 2.8 as follow
σ{0;3}ðð07,03Þ þ T{0;3}ðVÞÞ ¼ σ{0;3}ðð07,03ÞÞ þ T{0;3}ðWÞ
¼ ð07,1AÞ þ T{0;3}ðWÞ :
The images of every element of this coset are given in Figure 2.7. For instance,
σ{0;3}ðð07,03Þ þ ð01,1CÞÞ ¼ σ{0;3}ð06,1FÞ ¼ ðS0ð06Þ, S3ð1FÞÞ ¼ ð01,07Þ
¼ ð07,1AÞ þ ð06,1DÞ :
This explains the second image. ▴
Choosing E = {i} in Proposition 2.22 gives that the S-box Si maps LðT {i}ðVÞÞ to LðT {i}ðWÞÞ. As
this result holds for each index i in ½½0;m½½, we deduce that
σðLðVÞÞ ¼ LðWÞ ) ∀i∈ ½½0;m½½, SiðLðT{i}ðVÞÞÞ ¼ LðT{i}ðWÞÞ : (2.1)
However, the equivalence does not hold in general. Hence, this only gives a necessary condi-
tion on each S-box. In other words, this means that we can lose information when considering
each S-box independently. The next example stresses this fact.
Example 2.24. In our example, the truncated subspaces T{i}(V) and T{i}(W) are the following:
T{0}ðVÞ ¼ F
5
2, T{1}ðVÞ ¼ {00}, T{2}ðVÞ ¼ spanð07,1AÞ, T{3}ðVÞ ¼ spanð0B,17Þ,
T{0}ðWÞ ¼ F
5
2, T{1}ðWÞ ¼ {00}, T{2}ðWÞ ¼ spanð0B,17Þ, T{3}ðWÞ ¼ spanð08,15Þ:
Figure 2.7. σ{0,3} mapping a coset of T{0,3}(V) to a coset of T{0,3}(W).
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First, observe that the truncated subspaces for S0 and S1 are trivial. Hence, the associated linear
partitions are also trivial and no information on S0 or S1 can be drawn from 2.1. Yet, the last
two truncated subspaces are nontrivial and 1 gives the following equalities:
S2ðLðspanð07,1AÞÞÞ ¼ Lðspanð0B,17ÞÞ ,
S3ðLðspanð0B,17ÞÞÞ ¼ Lðspanð08,15ÞÞ :
The first property has already been highlighted in Example 2.7 and in Figure 2.2. The second
one is represented in Figure 2.8.
Let us now show that the converse of Implication 2.1 does not hold in general. Consider the
substitution layer σ0 made up of the four S-boxes S00, S
0
1, S
0
2 and S
0
3 where
S00 ¼ S1 , S
0
1 ¼ S1 , S
0
2 ¼ S2 , S
0
3 ¼ S3 :
Thus, this new substitution layer differs from σ by only one S-box. Recall that the linear
partition associated with T{0}ðVÞ ¼ T{0}ðWÞ is trivial. Therefore, S
0
0 necessarily preserves this
partition. As the other S-boxes remain the same, the right side of 2.1 still holds for σ0, that is
∀i∈ ½½0; 4½½, S0 iðLðT{i}ðVÞÞÞ ¼ LðT{i}ðWÞÞ :
However, we will prove that σ0 does not map LðVÞ to LðWÞ. Suppose by contradiction that it
does. Then Proposition 2.22 ensures that σ0{0;3} maps LðT{0;3}ðVÞÞ to LðT{0;3}ðWÞÞ. By Lemma 2.8,
σ0{0;3}ðð07,03Þ þ T{0;3}ðVÞÞ ¼ σ
0
{0;3}ð07,03Þ þ T{0;3}ðWÞ
¼ ðS00ð07Þ, S
0
3ð03ÞÞ þ T{0;3}ðWÞ
¼ ðS1ð07Þ, S3ð03ÞÞ þ T{0;3}ðWÞ ¼ ð07,1AÞ þ T{0;3}ðWÞ :
Then
σ0{0;3}ðð07,03Þ þ ð01,1CÞÞ ¼ σ
0
{0;3}ð06,1FÞ ¼ ðS
0
0ð06Þ, S
0
3ð1FÞÞ ¼ ðS1ð06Þ, S3ð1FÞÞ
¼ ð0C,07Þ ¼ ð07,1AÞ þ ð0B,1DÞ :
This is a contradiction since (0B,1D) does not belong to T {0;3}ðWÞ as can be seen in Figure 2.7.
As a consequence, the substitution layer σ0 does not map LðVÞ to LðWÞ. ▴
As shown in the previous example, truncating the substitution layer and the subspaces V and
W to each S-box independently of the others is too restrictive in general. This suggests that
Figure 2.8. The S-box S3 mapping LðV
0Þ to LðW 0Þ where V 0 ¼ spanð0B,17Þ andW 0 ¼ spanð08,15Þ.
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some S-boxes can in a way be linked together. That is to say, considering them independently
results in a loss of information on the subspaces V and W. Recall that we are interested in
splitting the problem of finding all the substitution layers σ mapping LðVÞ to LðWÞ into
several independent smaller problems. Taking into account that some S-boxes can be linked
together, we require the following:
• a sub-problem can involve several S-boxes;
• the same S-box cannot be involved in two different sub-problems (in other words, the sub-
problems are independent);
• each S-box is involved in one sub-problem (possibly trivial).
This is naturally formalized by a partition I of ½½0;m½½. Each part I of I represents a sub-problem,
and its elements are the indices of the S-boxes involved in. By virtue of Proposition 2.22, it
holds that
σðLðVÞÞ ¼ LðWÞ ) ∀I ∈ I , σIðLðT IðVÞÞÞ ¼ LðT IðWÞÞ : (2.2)
The next section aims to find a sufficient condition on the partition I to obtain the equivalence.
In such a case, this means that combining the solutions of these sub-problems yields a substi-
tution layer mapping LðVÞ to LðWÞ and vice versa.
3.2. Structure of the subspaces V andW
With the aim of ending up with partitions for which the converse of 2.2 holds, let us introduce
a few definitions and notations.
Definition 2.25 (trivial product). Let E be a subset of ½½0;m½½. The trivial product subspace
associated with E, denoted by TrivE, is defined to be
TrivE ¼ {x∈ ðF
n
2Þ
m j ∀i∈Ec, xi¼ 0n} :
Moreover, we denote by VE the intersection of V and TrivE, that is VE ¼ V ∩TrivE ¼ {v∈V j ∀i
∈Ec, vi¼ 0n}. The subspaceWE is defined in the same way.
Remark 2.26. It is easily seen that
TrivE ¼
Ym1
i¼0
Triv
½i
E with Triv
½i
E ¼
{0n} if i∈E
c ,
F
n
2 if i∈E :

Thus, a trivial product subspace is the Cartesian product of trivial spaces for each S-box; this
justifies its name. Additionally, if E⊆ F, then TrivE ⊆TrivF, and hence VE ⊆VF andWE ⊆WF.
The subspaces TrivE are essential in the study of the substitution layer because the latter
always preserves the partition LðTrivEÞ regardless of its S-boxes. This result, together with
Proposition 2.10, establishes the following corollary.
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Corollary 2.27. Let E be a subset of ½½0;m½½. If σ maps LðVÞ to LðWÞ, then σ also maps LðVEÞ to
LðWEÞ.
Example 2.28. All the subspaces VE are graphically represented in Figure 2.9. For instance,
V {0} ¼ spanðð15,00,00,00Þ, ð0D,00,00,00Þ, ð03,00,00,00ÞÞ :
Additionally, this figure also highlights the expected inclusions given by Remark 2.26. Observe
that BV ¼ ðviÞ0 ≤ i<7 is a basis of V. This new basis is more convenient than the echelonized basis
EV previously introduced in Example 2.19 since all the VE are then easily described. It is worth
noting that the same picture remains valid for the subspaceW. For example,
Figure 2.9. The subspaces VE,WE for each subset E of {0,1,2,3}.
Partition-Based Trapdoor Ciphers
http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.70420
23
W {0} ¼ spanðð14,00,00,00Þ, ð0E,00,00,00Þ, ð01,00,00,00ÞÞ :
This emphasizes that when the substitution layer maps LðVÞ to LðWÞ, the subspaces V and W
have the same structure.
According to Corollary 2.27, the substitution layer maps LðV {0}Þ to LðW {0}Þ. Next, truncate to
E = {0} using Proposition 2.22 to obtain
S0ðLðspanð03,0D,15ÞÞÞ ¼ Lðspanð01,0E,14ÞÞ :
This property is depicted in Figure 2.10. Finally, it should be underlined that with Proposition
2.22 alone, no property can be established on the S-box S0 (see Example 2.24). ▴
Definition 2.29 (projection PE). Let E be a subset of ½½0;m½½. The projection PE from ðF
n
2Þ
m onto
TrivE is defined by PEðx0,…, xm1Þ ¼ ðy0,…, ym1Þ where yi = xi if i belongs to E and yi = 0n
otherwise.
Remark 2.30. It is not hard to see that PE is a linear mapping and that VE is always a subspace
of PE(V). Moreover, it holds that TEðVÞ ¼ TEðPEðVÞÞ.
The next lemma gives some relations between the previous definitions. It is quite important
and will be used several times by the end of the current chapter.
Lemma 2.31. Let I be a partition of ½½0;m½½. Then V equals the internal direct sum ⊕ I ∈ IV I if and
only if V I ¼ PIðVÞ for any part I of I . In this case, the decomposition of an element v of V is
v ¼
P
I ∈ IPIðvÞ.
Remark 2.32. Suppose that I is a partition of ½½0;m½½ such that V ¼ ⊕ I∈ IV I . The previous
lemma, together with Remark 2.30, establishes that TIðVÞ ¼ TIðV IÞ for each part I of I .
Proposition 2.33 (Substitution layer structure). Let I be a partition of ½½0;m½½ satisfying both
V ¼ ⊕ I ∈ IV I andW ¼ ⊕ I∈ IW I . The permutation σmaps LðVÞ to LðWÞ if and only if σI maps
LðT IðVÞÞ to LðT IðWÞÞ for any I in I .
The preceding proposition establishes that the converse of Implication 2.2 (page 21) holds
whenever the partition I satisfies both V ¼ ⊕ I ∈ IV I and W ¼ ⊕ I ∈ IW I . For such a partition,
the problem of finding all the substitution layers σmapping LðVÞ to LðWÞ can equivalently be
broken down into the independent sub-problems of finding all the σI mapping LðTIðVÞÞ to
LðTIðWÞÞ for each part I of I .
Figure 2.10. The S-box S0 mapping LðV
0Þ to LðW 0Þ where V 0 ¼ spanð03,0D,15Þ and W 0 ¼ spanð01,0E,14Þ.
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3.3. Linked and independent S-boxes
Of course, there may be several partitions I such that V ¼ ⊕ I ∈ IV I and W ¼ ⊕ I ∈ IW I , each
yielding a different decomposition of the substitution layer. A few of these decompositions are
certainly more interesting or easier to solve. The purpose of this section is to study such
partitions. Let us begin with the following lemma.
Lemma 2.34. Suppose that σ maps LðVÞ to LðWÞ. For every partition I of ½½0;m½½, V ¼ ⊕ I ∈ IV I
if and only if W ¼ ⊕ I ∈ IW I .
The contrapositive of Lemma 2.34 is the following: if there exists a partition I such that
V ¼ ⊕ I ∈ IV I and W 6¼ ⊕ I ∈ IW I or such that V 6¼ ⊕ I∈ IV I and W ¼ ⊕ I ∈ IW I , then there
exists no substitution layer mapping LðVÞ to LðWÞ. Because we intend to study the substitu-
tion layers mapping LðVÞ to LðWÞ, Lemma 2.34 suggests to assume the following.
Assumption 2.35. For the remainder of this section, we assume that for any partition I of
½½0;m½½, it holds that
V ¼ ⊕
I∈ I
V I⇔W ¼ ⊕
I ∈ I
W I :
Proposition 2.33, together with the preceding assumption, suggests the following definition.
Definition 2.36 (decomposition partition). A decomposition partition (with respect to V and W)
is a partition of ½½0;m½½ such that V ¼ ⊕ I∈ IV I .
Remark 2.37 (partial order on partitions). Recall that if I and J are two partitions of ½½0;m½½,
then the partition I is said to be finer than J if for any part I in I , there exists a part J in J such
that I ⊆ J.
Example 2.38. The purpose of this example is to find all the decomposition partitions with
regard to V and W. By virtue of Lemma 2.31, the subspace V can be decomposed as ⊕ I ∈ IV I if
and only if VI is equal to PI(V) for each part I of I . The eight-framed subspaces in the middle of
Figure 2.9 are exactly those that satisfy VE ¼ PEðVÞ. Hence, the decomposition partitions are
the partitions whose parts are selected from the following:
∅, {1}, {2}, {1; 2}, {0; 3}, {0; 1; 3}, {0; 2; 3}, {0; 1; 2; 3} :
It is then easy to check that the decomposition partitions of V are:
{{1}, {2}, {0; 3}} , {{1}, {0; 2; 3}} , {{2}, {0; 1; 3}} ,
{{0; 3}, {1; 2}} and {{0; 1; 2; 3}} :
In Figure 2.11, all the partitions of ½½0; 4½½ are ordered by the “finer-than” relation, and the
decomposition partitions are emphasized. What stands out is that the decomposition partition
{{1}, {2}, {0, 3}} is finer than all other decomposition partitions. ▴
The existence of this least decomposition partition in the example above is a very welcome and
nontrivial property. This means that all the truncated substitution layers obtained using
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Proposition 2.33 are the smallest possible. Thus, such a partition should be preferred to any
other decomposition partition. We will now prove that this least decomposition partition
always exists.
Proposition 2.39. The set of the partitions I of ½½0;m½½ satisfying V ¼ ⊕ I ∈ IV I has a least element
denoted I ld.
Consequently, the only decomposition partition that will be considered in the remainder of this
chapter is the least decomposition partition I ld. The following definition is inspired by Propo-
sition 2.33 and Proposition 2.39.
Definition 2.40 (linked and independent S-boxes). Suppose that σ maps LðVÞ to LðWÞ. Let I
be a part of I ld.
• If I = {i}, the S-box Si is said to be independent of the other S-boxes.
Moreover, if V {i}¼ {0nm} or V {i} ¼ Triv{i}, the S-box Si is said to be inactive. Otherwise, Si is
active.
• If #I ≥ 2, then the S-boxes whose indices lie in I are said to be linked together.
Remark 2.41. Let 0 ≤ i ≤ m be an integer. We have already noted that the substitution layer σ
always preserves Lð{0nm}Þ and LðTriv{i}Þ. In addition, Proposition 2.33 ensures that σ maps
LðV {i}Þ to LðW {i}Þ. Consequently, if V {i}¼ {0nm} or if V {i} ¼ Triv{i}, then V{i}=W{i}.
Figure 2.11. The partitions I of {0, 1, 2, 3} such that V ¼ ⊕ I ∈ IVI .
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Suppose that the S-box Si is independent with regard to the subspaces V andW. As established
by Proposition 2.33 and Remark 2.32, if Si is replaced with another S-box S
0
i, then this new
substitution layer still maps LðVÞ to LðWÞ provided that S0i maps LðT {i}ðV {i}ÞÞ to LðT {i}ðW {i}ÞÞ.
Suppose further that Si is active. By definition, f0nmg⊈V {i} ⊈Triv{i}. Observe that the restriction
of T{i} to Triv{i} is one-to-one, hence
f0n} ¼ T{i}ðf0nm}Þ⊈T{i}ðV {i}Þ⊈T{i}ðTriv{i}Þ ¼ F
n
2 :
Thus, T{i}(V{i}) is a nontrivial subspace of F
n
2 and the requirement that S
0
i maps LðT {i}ðV {i}ÞÞ to
LðT {i}ðW {i}ÞÞ is also nontrivial. Therefore, an independent active S-box can be chosen indepen-
dently of the other S-boxes but has to respect the structure of the subspaces V and W.
Now suppose that Si is inactive. By definition, V {i}¼ {0nm} or V {i} ¼ Triv{i}. Then, the equality
V {i} ¼ W {i} follows from Remark 2.41 and we have that
T{i}ðV {i}Þ ¼ T{i}ðW {i}Þ ¼ f0n} or T{i}ðV {i}Þ ¼ T{i}ðW {i}Þ ¼ F
n
2 :
In either case, the condition that S0 i maps LðT{i}ðV {i}ÞÞ to LðT{i}ðW {i}ÞÞ is trivial, and any S-box
fulfills it. As a consequence, an independent inactive S-box can be freely chosen. In other
words, such an S-box has no impact on the fact that σmaps LðVÞ to LðWÞ.
Finally, suppose that some S-boxes are linked together. If only one of these S-boxes is replaced
independently of the others, then the desired property of the substitution layer may not hold.
Example 2.42. As we have seen in Example 2.38 and Figure 2.11, the least decomposition
partition with regard to the subspaces V and W is I ld ¼ {{1}, {2}, {0; 3}}. By Proposition 2.33,
the substitution layer maps LðVÞ to LðWÞ is and only if the following equalities hold:
σ{0;3}ðLðT{0;3}ðVÞÞÞ ¼ LðT{0;3}ðWÞÞ ,
S1ðLðT{1}ðVÞÞ ¼ LðT{1}ðWÞÞ ,
S2ðLðT{2}ðVÞÞ ¼ LðT{2}ðWÞÞ :
Thus, the S-box S1 is independent of the other S-boxes, the same applies to S2 and the S-boxes
S0 and S3 are linked together. As was already noted in Figure 2.9, we have that
V {1} ¼ {ð00,00,00,00Þ} and V {2} ¼ spanðð00,00,1A,00Þ, ð00,00,07,00ÞÞ :
Therefore, the S-box S2 is active while S1 is inactive. ▴
3.4. The forbidden case
Throughout this section, we assume that the substitution layer σ maps LðVÞ to LðWÞ. In order
to prove the last main theorem of this chapter, we need to consider the following particular
case.
Proposition 2.43. Let I be a decomposition partition. Let I be a part of I such that #I ≥ 2 and let
E be a nonempty proper subset of I. Suppose that VE ¼ V I\E¼ {0nm} and PEðVÞ ¼ TrivE. Then,
for all i in E, Si is an affine mapping.
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If the subspace V satisfies the assumption of the proposition above, then at least one of S-boxes
has to be affine. Nowadays, an SPN whose substitution layer has an affine S-box cannot be
taken seriously. Additionally, such a cipher is likely to be very weak to differential and linear
cryptanalysis. This discussion explains the title of this section.
Example 2.44. As seen in Example 2.38, the least decomposition partition is
I ld ¼ {{1}, {2}, {0; 3}}. Its only part of cardinality greater than or equal to 2 is I ¼ {0; 3}. The
nonempty proper subsets of I are the E = {0} and E = {1}. According to Figure 2.9, we have
V {0} 6¼ {020}. Consequently, Proposition 2.43 does not apply to this example, and this is good
news because none of the S-boxes is affine. Otherwise, this would have disproved the contra-
positive of Proposition 2.43.
Now let us introduce another example. Consider a substitution layer σ0 made up of two 3-bit S-
boxes S00 and S
0
1; hence, its parameters are m = 2 and n = 3. Define the subspaces V
0 and W0 of
ðF32Þ
2 by
V 0 ¼ W 0 ¼ spanðð4,4Þ, ð2,2Þ, ð1,1ÞÞ ¼ {ðx, xÞjx∈F32} :
Finally, suppose that σ0 maps LðV 0Þ to LðW 0Þ. It is easily seen that
V 0∅ ¼ {ð0,0Þ} , V
0
{0} ¼ {ð0,0Þ} , V
0
{1} ¼ {ð0,0Þ} , V
0
{0;1} ¼ V ,
P∅ðV
0Þ ¼ Triv∅ , P{0}ðV
0Þ ¼ Triv{0} , P{1}ðV
0Þ ¼ Triv{1} , P{0;1}ðV
0Þ ¼ V :
Thus, the least decomposition partition with regard to V0 andW0 is {{0, 1}}. The S-boxes S00 and
S01 are then linked together. Choosing E = {0} in Proposition 2.43 ensures that S
0
0 must be
affine. Similarly, we can prove that S01 must also be affine by considering E = {1}. As a result,
any substitution layer σ0 mapping LðV 0Þ to LðW 0Þ is necessary affine. These subspaces are thus
completely prohibited as the whole cipher is then affine. ▴
3.5. Reduction to one S-box
To prove our main result about the substitution layer, we need the following preliminary
lemma.
Lemma 2.45. Let I be a part of I ld and E be a non-empty proper subset of I.
• If VE is a trivial product subspace, then VE ¼ Triv∅¼ {0nm}.
• If PE(V) is a trivial product subspace, then PEðVÞ ¼ TrivE.
Now we have all the results needed, let us state and prove the main result of Section 3 which is
depicted in Figure 2.12.
Theorem 2.46. Let n ≥ 2 and m be two positive integers. Let S0,…,Sm–1 be n-bit S-boxes. Define
the permutation σ of ðFn2Þ
m, which maps the element ðxiÞ0 ≤ i<m to ðSiðxiÞÞ0 ≤ i<m. Let V and W be
two subspaces of ðFn2Þ
m such that σmaps LðVÞ to LðWÞ. Suppose that V is not a trivial product
subspace. Then, at least one of the S-boxes maps a nontrivial linear partition to another one.
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Proof. Let us prove this result by complete induction on the number m of S-boxes. Suppose
that m = 1. In this case, σ = S0. By hypothesis, V is different from {0n} and F
n
2 . Hence, LðVÞ is a
nontrivial partition and S0 maps LðVÞ to LðWÞ.
Letm ≥ 2 be an integer. Suppose that the result holds for any positive integer strictly lower than
m. First, suppose that all the S-boxes are independent. In other words, I ld ¼ {{i}ji∈ ½½0;m½½}. If
each S-box is inactive, then V is a trivial product subspace, a contradiction with our hypothesis.
Thus, there exists at least one active S-box Si. In this case, {0nm}⊈V {i} ⊈Triv{i}. According to
Lemma 2.31, the equality P {i}ðVÞ ¼ V {i} holds. Then, T{i}ðV {i}Þ ¼ T{i}ðP{i}ðVÞÞ ¼ T{i}ðVÞ is a
nontrivial subspace of Fn2 , so LðT{i}ðVÞÞ is also nontrivial. Finally, Proposition 2.22 states that
Si maps LðT {i}ðVÞÞ to LðT {i}ðWÞÞ, and thus the result holds in this case.
Now, suppose that some S-boxes are linked together. Then, there exists an element I of I ld such
that I ≥ 2. Next, at least one of the following three cases holds.
1. Suppose that there exists a nonempty proper subset E of I such that PE(V) is not a trivial
product subspace. Let p denote the cardinality of E. Recall that TEðPEðVÞÞ ¼ TEðVÞ. It
follows that TE(V) is not a trivial product subspace of ðF
n
2Þ
p. According to Proposition
2.22, σE maps LðTEðVÞÞ to LðTEðWÞÞ. Note that E is a non-empty proper subset of I, so of
½½0;m½½. Hence p < m, so the induction hypothesis ensures that at least one of the S-boxes of
σm maps a nontrivial partition to another one.
2. Suppose that there exists a nonempty proper subset E of I such that VE is not a trivial
product subspace. Recall that σ maps LðVEÞ to LðWEÞ. Proposition 2.22 ensures that σE
maps LðTEðVEÞÞ to LðTEðWEÞÞ. It is easily seen that TE(VE) is not a trivial product sub-
space. As before, the result is a consequence of the induction hypothesis.
3. Suppose that there exists a nonempty proper subset E of I such that PEðVÞ, VE and VI\E are
all trivial product subspaces. Then, Lemma 2.45 implies that PE(V) = TrivE and
VE ¼ V I\E¼ {0nm}. According to Proposition 2.43, the S-boxes whose indices belong to E
are affine mappings. Combining Proposition 2.15 and 2.13, we see that these S-boxes map
any non-trivial linear partition to another one.
Figure 2.12. Diagrammatic representation of Theorem 2.46.
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In any case, the result holds for this integer m. The result follows by induction. ▪
Example 2.47. It is worthwhile to note that the proof of Theorem 2.46 is constructive. There-
fore, it gives a method to find necessary conditions on the S-boxes for the substitution layer to
map LðVÞ to LðWÞ. Let us apply this method to our main example.
The first step is equivalent to what had been done in Examples 2.38 and 2.42. Consider the least
decomposition partition I ld ¼ {{1}, {2}, {0; 3}} and deduce that:
• S1 is inactive;
• S2 is active and maps Lðspanð07,1AÞÞ to Lðspanð0E,12ÞÞ (see Figure 2.2);
• S0 and S3 are linked together.
Now, consider the part I = {0,3} of I ld. Thus, the nonempty proper subsets of I are {0} and {3}.
The first case requires to compute the following projections:
P{0}ðVÞ ¼ Triv{0} and P{3}ðVÞ ¼ spanðð00,00,00,0BÞ, ð00,00,00,1CÞÞ :
Thus, P{3}(V) is not a trivial product subspace. As in Example 2.24 and Figure 2.8, we see that
S3 maps Lð0B,1CÞ to Lð08,15Þ by truncating σ and the subspaces P{3}ðVÞ, P{3}ðWÞ to {3}. Now,
we need to compute the following subspaces:
V {0} ¼ spanðð03,00,00,00Þ, ð0D,00,00,00Þ, ð15,00,00,00ÞÞ and V {3} ¼ Triv∅ :
Since V{0} is not a trivial product subspace, the second case apply. Then, truncate the substitu-
tion layer σ and the subspaces V{0} and W{0} to prove that S0 maps Lð03,0D,15Þ to
Lð01,0E,14Þ. This property was stressed in Example 2.28 and Figure 2.9. Finally, recall that
the third case does not apply to these subspaces, as observed in Example 2.44. ▴
The preceding example covers only the first and the second cases in the treatment of linked S-
boxes given by the proof of Theorem 2.46. To illustrate the third case, we introduced the
following example.
Example 2.48. Let n = m = 3. Thus, the substitution layer σ is made up of three 3-bit S-boxes
denoted by S0, S1 and S2. Define the subspaces V and W of ðF
3
2Þ
3 by
V ¼ W ¼ {ðx, y, xþ yÞ j x, y∈F32}
and assume that the substitution layer σ maps LðVÞ to LðWÞ. By definition, it holds that
P∅ðVÞ ¼ {ð0,0,0Þ} and P{0;1;2}ðVÞ ¼ V. Then, for each nonempty proper subset E of {0,1,2}, it is
easily seen that PEðVÞ ¼ TrivE. For instance,
P{0;1}ðVÞ ¼ {ðx, y,0Þjx, y∈F
3
2} ¼ Triv{0;1} :
We know that V∅ ¼ {ð0,0,0Þ} and V {0;1;2}ðVÞ ¼ V. The other subspaces VE are the following:
Partition-based Trapdoor Ciphers30
V {0} ¼ {ð0,0,0Þ} , V {1} ¼ {ð0,0,0Þ} , V {2} ¼ {ð0,0,0Þ} ,
V {0;1} ¼ {ðx, x,0Þjx∈F
3
2} , V {0;2} ¼ {ðx,0, xÞjx∈F
3
2} , V {1;2} ¼ {ð0, x, xÞjx∈F
3
2} :
Thus, the equality PEðVÞ ¼ VE holds only for E ¼ ∅ and E = {0,1,2}. Consequently, the least
decomposition partition is I ld ¼ {{0,1,2}}, and hence, all the S-boxes are linked together.
From now on, we follow the method given in the proof of Theorem 2.46. As previously noted,
for each nonempty proper subset E of {0,1,2}, the projection PE(V) is a trivial product. There-
fore, the first case does not apply to this example. We move on to the second case. By
induction, the substitution layer and the subspaces V{0,1} and W{0,1} are truncated to {0,1}.
Hence, we now consider the permutation σ0 = σ{0,1}, which maps LðV
0Þ to LðW 0Þ where
V 0 ¼ W 0 ¼ T {0;1}ðV {0;1}Þ ¼ {ðx, xÞjx∈F
3
2} :
Such a substitution layer has already been studied in Example 2.44. Recall that
V 0∅ ¼ {ð0,0Þ} , V
0
{0} ¼ {ð0,0Þ} , V
0
{1} ¼ {ð0,0Þ} , V
0
{0;1} ¼ V ,
P∅ðV
0Þ ¼ Triv∅ , P{0}ðV
0Þ ¼ Triv{0} , P{1}ðV
0Þ ¼ Triv{1} , P{0;1}ðV
0Þ ¼ V :
Thus, the least decomposition partition with regard to V0 and W0 is {{0,1}}. Since V 0{0}, V
0
{1},
P{0}ðV
0Þ and P{1}ðV
0Þ are all trivial products, the first and second cases do not apply. Choosing
E = {0} and E = {1} in the third case proves that S0 and S1 are affine mappings. Come back to the
full substitution layer. Similarly, it is straightforward to verify that S2 must be affine by
truncating σ and the subspaces V{0,2}, W{0,2} to {0,2}. To summarize, we have proven that any
substitution layer mapping LðVÞ to LðWÞ is necessarily affine. ▴
In this chapter, we have studied a generic SPNmapping a partitionA of Fnm2 to a partitionB of F
nm
2 ,
independently of the round keys used. Combining Theorem 2.17 and Corollary 2.18, we proved
that there exist two families ðV ½iÞ0 ≤ i ≤ r and ðW
½iÞ0 ≤ i ≤ r of subspaces of F
nm
2 such that the substitution
layer σmaps LðV ½iÞ to LðW ½iÞ for each 0 ≤ i ≤ r. This result has been illustrated in Figure 2.5.
First, suppose that all the V[i] are trivial products. In such a case, the diffusion layer of the
cipher is probably not playing its role (or the round number is very small). As is generally the
case, suppose that there is no diffusion layer in the last round of the SPN. Then, the input and
the output partitions are both linear partitions associated with a trivial product subspace. This
implies that some ciphertext bits are independent of some plaintext bits. Such a property must
be avoided in any good cipher.
Now, suppose that at least one of the V[i] is not a trivial product. This second case is far more
interesting than the previous one. By virtue of Theorem 2.46, at least one of the S-boxes must
map a nontrivial linear partition to another one, as illustrated in Figure 2.12.
Thus, we have proven in this chapter that any good partition-based trapdoor SPN has at least
on S-box mapping a nontrivial linear partition to another one. The following chapter aims to
design such an S-box with the best security against both differential and linear cryptanalysis.
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Analysis of a backdoor S-box
Differential [21] and linear [22] cryptanalysis are considered as the most important attacks
against block ciphers [23]. The resistance of an S-box against these attacks is assessed by its
difference distribution table and its linear approximation table respectively.
Let S be an n-bit S-box. The difference distribution table and the linear distribution table of S
are the two families DTS and LTS indexed by ðF
n
2Þ
2 and defined for any (a, b) in ðFn2Þ
2 by
DTSða, bÞ ¼ #{x∈F
n
2 j SðxÞ þ Sðxþ aÞ ¼ b} ,
LTSða, bÞ ¼ #{x∈F
n
2 j 〈a, x〉 ¼ 〈b, SðxÞ〉} 2
n1 :
Moreover, the S-box S is said to be differentially δ-uniform if DTSða, bÞ ≤ δ for any (a, b) in ðF
n
2Þ
2
with a 6¼ 0. Similarly, S is linearly λ-uniform if jLTSða, bÞj ≤λ for every (a, b) in ðF
n
2Þ
2 with b 6¼ 0. It
is worthwhile to mention that the smaller the differential uniformity is, the more resistant S is
against differential cryptanalysis. The same applies for linear cryptanalysis.
Remark 3.1. It can be proven that any n-bit S-box is at least linearly 2
n1
2 -uniform.
Recall that two permutations S1 and S2 of F
n
2 are said to be equivalent if there exist two linear
mappings L1, L2 of F
n
2 and two elements v1, v2 of F
n
2 such that
∀x∈Fn2 , S2ðxÞ ¼ L2ðS1ðL1ðxÞ þ v1ÞÞ þ v2:
It is well known that equivalent permutations have the same differential uniformity and the
same linear uniformity, see for instance [24, 25]. More precisely, their differential tables are
equal up to row and column permutations. This result holds for linear tables up to the sign of
the coefficients.
Let V and W be two subspaces of Fn2 . Suppose that S
0 is an n-bit S-Box mapping LðVÞ to LðWÞ.
Proposition 2.11 ensures that there exists an automorphism L of Fn2 such that LðVÞ ¼ W . Since
L1ðWÞ ¼ V, Proposition 2.15 states that L1 maps LðWÞ to LðVÞ. Then, S ¼ L1 ∘ S0 is equiva-
lent to S0 and maps LðVÞ to LðVÞ. This discussion establishes the following proposition.
Proposition 3.2. Let V and W be two subspaces of Fn2 . If S
0 is an n-bit S-box mapping LðVÞ to
LðWÞ, then there exists an S-box S equivalent to S0 preserving LðVÞ.
Remark 3.3. Conversely, suppose that S preservesLðVÞ. LetW be any subspace isomorphic to V.
Then find an automorphism L such that L(V) =W. By Proposition 2.15, L ∘ Smaps LðVÞ to LðWÞ.
As with Section 3, let us introduce an example that we will continue throughout this section.
Example 3.4. Consider the 5-bit S-box S0 given in Figure 3.1. This S-box has already been met
twice in Examples 2.7 and 2.19 (refered to as f and S2 respectively). Thus, we know that S
0
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maps LðVÞ to LðWÞ where V ¼ spanð07,1AÞ and W ¼ spanð0E,12Þ. Following the proof of
Proposition 2.11, an automorphism L of F52 satisfying L(V) = W was constructed in Example
2.12. Its inverse L1 and the composition S = L1S0 are given in Figure 3.1. For instance,
Sð07Þ ¼ L1ðS0ð07ÞÞ ¼ L1ð10Þ ¼ 18. It is easy to check in Figure 3.2 that S preserves the
linear partition LðVÞ. Finally, it is worth observing how Figures 2.2 and 3.2 look similar. This
explains our choices to construct the automorphism L. ▴
By virtue of Proposition 3.2, we can assume without loss of generality that V = W in our study
of the linear and differential properties of an S-box mapping LðVÞ to LðWÞ.
Throughout this section, we consider the following
• let V be a d-dimensional nontrivial subspace of Fn2 ,
• let U be a complement space of V,
• let S be an n-bit S-box preserving LðVÞ.
Therefore, the space Fn2 can be written as the direct sumU⊕V. In other words, every element x
of Fn2 can be uniquely written as the sum x = u + v where u and v belong to U and V,
respectively. Let [u] denote the coset of V with respect to u. Thus, [u] = u + V is the unique part
of LðVÞ where u lies in and we have
LðVÞ ¼ {½uju∈U} :
Since V is d-dimensional, the complement space U is (n – d)-dimensional. In addition, we have
the following inequalities
1 ≤ d ≤ n 1 and 1 ≤ n d ≤n 1
Figure 3.1. Construction of the S-box S used throughout Chapter 3.
Figure 3.2. The permutation S preserving LðVÞ where V ¼ spanð07,1AÞ.
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because V is assumed to be a nontrivial subspace of Fn2 .
The following theorem describes the structure of permutations preserving a linear partition. It
can be seen as a corollary of the Krasner-Kaloujnine embedding theorem [26]. However, for
convenience, we give a direct constructive proof.
Theorem 3.5. There exist a unique permutation ρ of U and a unique family of permutations
ðτuÞu∈U of V such that, for all x = u + v in F
n
2 ,
Sðuþ vÞ ¼ ρðuÞ þ τuðvÞ :
Conversely, if ρ is a permutation of U and if ðτuÞu∈U is a family of permutations of V, then the
mapping S0 defined by S0ðuþ vÞ ¼ ρðuÞ þ τuðvÞ preserves LðVÞ.
Proof. By hypothesis, S preserves LðVÞ. Thus, S induces a permutation ρ of U defined as
follows. Let u be an element of U. Hence, there exists a unique u0 in U such as f ð½uÞ ¼ ½u0.
Define then ρðuÞ ¼ u0. For each element u ofU, define the permutation τu of V, which maps v to
Sðuþ vÞ þ ρðuÞ. By construction, for any u in U and any v in V, we have
τuðvÞ ¼ Sðuþ vÞ þ ρðuÞ and hence Sðuþ vÞ ¼ ρðuÞ þ τuðvÞ:
The existence of the permutations ρ and τu is proven. Now, let us show their uniqueness.
Suppose that there exist a permutation ~ρ of U and a family of permutations ð~τuÞu∈U of V
satisfying the result. Let (u, v) be an element of U  V. By hypothesis, we have
ρðuÞ þ τuðvÞ ¼ ~ρðuÞ þ ~τuðvÞ :
Because the sum of U and V is direct, it follows that ρðuÞ ¼ ~ρðuÞ and τuðvÞ ¼ ~τuðvÞ. The
uniqueness of ρ and the τu follows.
Conversely, let ρ be a permutation ofU and ðτuÞu∈U be a family of permutations of V. Denote S
0
the mapping from Fn2 to F
n
2 defined by S
0ðuþ vÞ ¼ ρðuÞ þ τuðvÞ. Since F
n
2 ¼ U⊕V and ρ and
the τu are permutations of U and V respectively, The mapping S
0 is a permutation of Fn2 . Let u
be an element of U. It holds that
S0ð½uÞ ¼ {S0ðuþ vÞjv∈V} ¼ {ρðuÞ þ τuðvÞjv∈V}
¼ ρðuÞ þ {τuðvÞjv∈V} ¼ ρðuÞ þ V ¼ ½ρðuÞ :
Hence, S0 preserves the linear partition LðVÞ. ▪
This theorem allows us to design an S-box that preserves LðVÞ using permutations with
smaller domains. Furthermore, these permutations can be chosen arbitrarily.
Example 3.6. Consider the complement subspace U of V defined by
U ¼ spanð01,02,08Þ ¼ {00,01,02,03,08,09,0A,0B} :
Figure 3.2 shows that S induces a permutation ρ of U. For instance, ρð00Þ ¼ 02 because Smaps
the part [00] to [02]. The whole permutation ρ is given in Figure 3.3. For each u in U, define the
permutation τu of V by τuðvÞ ¼ Sðuþ vÞ þ ρðuÞ. For example,
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τ02ð1DÞ ¼ Sð02þ 1DÞ þ ρð02Þ ¼ Sð1FÞ þ ρð02Þ ¼ 12þ 08 ¼ 1A :
The permutations τu are also given in Figure 3.3. Informally, the permutation ρ tells us how S
permutes the parts of LðVÞ and the permutations ðτuÞu∈U describe how the elements are
moved inside each part (Figure 3.4). ▴
In the rest of this section, the permutation ρ and the family ðτuÞu∈U given by Theorem 3.5 are fixed.
The goal of this part is to express the linear and differential properties of S according to the
ones of the permutations ρ and ðτuÞu∈U . However, these permutations are not defined on F
n
2
but on the subspaces U and V of Fn2 . Thus, the concept of linear or differential table is inexistent
for such maps. To solve this problem, we define two isomorphisms between U and Fnd2 and
between V and Fd2. Then, we consider the maps induced by ρ and ðτuÞu∈U on these spaces.
Notation 3.7. Let BU ¼ ðuiÞi<nd and BV ¼ ðviÞi<nd be two bases of U and V respectively.
Define the following mappings:
LU : F
nd
2 ! U LV : F
d
2 ! V
ðxnd1,…, x0Þ↦
Xnd1
i0
xiui, ðyd1,…, y0Þ↦
Xd1
i¼0
yivi:
It is easily seen that LU and LV are both isomorphisms of vector spaces. Define the permutation
ρ0 ¼ L1U ρLU of F
nd
2 . Finally, for each u in U, let τ
0
u denote the permutation L
1
V τuLV of F
d
2.
Example 3.8. Consider the bases BU ¼ ð01,02,08Þ and BV ¼ ð07,1AÞ and define the isomor-
phisms LU and LV. The permutation ρ
0 of F32 and the permutations τ
0
u of F
2
2 are given in
Figure 3.5. ▴
1. Linear approximation table
The next theorem links the linear tables of S and ρ0. The coefficients of the linear approximation
table of S taken into account by this result are in practice the greatest. Thus, they generally
determine the linear uniformity of S.
Theorem 3.9. Let a and b be two elements of V⊥. Denote at ¼ L⊺UðaÞ and b
t ¼ L⊺UðbÞ. Then,
LTSða, bÞ ¼ 2
d  LTρ0ða
t, btÞ :
Remark 3.10. Consider the map L⊺U : F
n
2 ! F
nd
2 . Then, kerðL
⊺
UÞ ¼ ðImLUÞ
⊥ ¼ U⊥ :Observe that
U⊥ ∩V⊥ ¼ ðU þ VÞ⊥ ¼ ðFn2Þ
⊥ ¼ {0}. Consequently, the restriction L⊺U : V
⊥ ! Fnd2 is one-to-one
and thus onto because of the rank-nullity theorem.
Example 3.11. The restriction L⊺U : V
⊥ ! F32 is given by the following table.
a 00 05 0B 0E 13 16 18 1D
L⊺UðaÞ 0 1 7 6 3 2 4 5
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Figure 3.3. The permutation S preserving LðVÞ where V ¼ spanð07,1AÞ.
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Reorder the rows and the columns of the linear approximation table of S to begin with
ððL⊺UÞ
1ðxÞÞx∈F32
, as suggested by Theorem 3.9. The reordered linear table is shown in
Figure 3.6. Each dot “” in this figure stands for the integer 0. With this order, it is easily seen
that the top left part of LTS is exactly the linear table of ρ
0 multiplied by 2d = 4. For instance,
LTSð1D,16Þ ¼ 2
2  LTρ0ð5,2Þ ¼ 8 because L
⊺
Uð1DÞ ¼ 5 and L
⊺
Uð16Þ ¼ 2. ▴
Corollary 3.12. The S-box S is at least linearly 2ðnþd1Þ=2-uniform.
Proof. As noted in Remark 3.1, there exist two elements at and bt of Fnd2 both nonzero such
that jLTρ0ða
t, btÞj ≥ 2ðnd1Þ=2. Let a and b denote the elements ðL⊺UÞ
1ðatÞ and ðL⊺UÞ
1ðbtÞ of Fn2 .
Then, Theorem 3.9 implies that
jLTSða, bÞj¼ 2
d  jLTρ0ða
t, btÞj ≥ 2d  2ðnd1Þ=2¼ 2ðnþd1Þ=2 :
Observe that a and b are nonzero and the result is proven. ▪
Remark 3.13. It is well-known that any 4-bit S-box is at least linearly 4-uniform, see for
example [27]. As a consequence, the permutation S is at least 2d+2-uniform if n–d = 4. Similarly,
any 2-bit S-Box is linearly 2-uniform, and hence S is at least 2d+1-uniform if n – d = 2.
Example 3.14. It is easily seen that S is linearly 8-uniform in Figure 3.6. The lower bound given
by Corollary 3.12 is 2ðnþd1Þ=2¼ 2ð5þ21Þ=2 ¼ 8. Therefore, this bound is tight on this example. ▴
Figure 3.4. The linear transformations LU and LV.
Figure 3.5. The family of permutations ðτ0uÞu∈U and the permutation ρ
0.
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Figure 3.6. The reordered linear table of S.
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2. Differential distribution table
Unlike linear cryptanalysis, where only a local view of the table was provided, the results for
differential cryptanalysis bring both local and global outlooks.
Theorem 3.15. Let a ¼ ua þ va and b ¼ ub þ vb be elements of F
n
2 . Denote u
0
a ¼ L
1
U ðuaÞ and
u0b ¼ L
1
U ðubÞ. Then X
i∈ ½ua
DTSði, bÞ ¼
X
j∈ ½ub
DTSða, jÞ ¼ 2
d DTρ0ðu
0
a, u
0
bÞ :
Especially, DTSða, bÞ ≤ 2
d DTρ0ðu
0
a, u
0
bÞ.
The preceding theorem can be restated in the following way. If DTS is rearranged coset by
coset, a simple operation enables recovery of DTρ0. On the other hand, the next theorem is
similar to Theorem 3.9 but for differential cryptanalysis. Again, it generally highlights the
coefficients of DTS involved in the differential uniformity of S.
Theorem 3.16. Let va and vb be two elements of V. Denote v
0
a ¼ L
1
V ðvaÞ and v
0
b ¼ L
1
V ðvbÞ. Then
DTSðva, vbÞ ¼
X
u∈U
DTτ0uðv
0
a, v
0
bÞ :
Particularly, the subtable ðDTSðva,vbÞÞva,vb ∈V is uniquely determined by the differential tables
ðDTτ0uÞu∈U .
Example 3.17. To illustrate Theorems 3.15 and 3.16, reorder the rows and the columns of the
differential table of S as presented in Figure 3.7. With this order, we can see the differential
table of ρ0 by considering the differential table of S coset by coset. In fact, Theorem 3.15 states
that the sum of all elements in the same row or column of the subtable DTSð½u1, ½u2Þ is equal to
the coefficient (x1, x2) of DTρ0 multiplied by 2
2, where xi ¼ L
1
V ðuiÞ. For instance, if we consider
the subtable
we can see that the sum of each row or column is equal to 8 ¼ 22 DTρ0ð5,3Þ since LV(5) = 09
and LV(3) = 03.
Finally, Theorem 3.16 ensures that the subtable DTSðV, VÞ ¼ DTSð½00, ½00Þ is the sum of the
differential tables ðDTτ0u Þu∈U. ▴
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Figure 3.7. The reordered differential table of S.
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Corollary 3.18. The permutation S is at least δ-uniform for the differential cryptanalysis where
δ denotes the even integer directly greater than or equal to 2
n
2d1
.
Example 3.19. In Figure 3.7, we can see that S is differentially 12-uniform. Thus, this S-box
reaches the lower bound given by Corollary 3.18. ▴
3. The design of a trapdoor S-box
First, let us summarize the theorems of this section.
• Theorem 3.9 implies to reduce at most the linear uniformity of ρ0 to keep the one of S as
small as possible.
• In the same way, Theorem 3.15 implies to reduce at most the differential uniformity of ρ0.
• The same theorem also stresses that the greater the number of nonzero coefficients of DTρ0
is, the better.
• Finally, Theorem 3.16 teaches us that the sum of the differential distribution tables DTτ0u
should be as low as possible.
Now, to design the S-box S, one needs to pick a permutation ρ0 of Fnd2 with the smallest
uniformities for linear and differential cryptanalysis. Then, one searches for permutations τ0u
of Fd2 satisfying the last condition. This search can be conducted randomly over every d-bit S-
boxes. Finally, construct the S-box S as in the converse of Theorem 3.5. If the differential and
linear uniformities of S are too far from the lower bounds given by Corollaries 3.12 and 3.18
and by Remark 3.13, then start again. In practice, these bounds are reached (or almost reached)
after a small number of iterations.
Moreover, observe that the closer the dimension d of V from n is, the weaker the S-box S is
against linear cryptanalysis and the stronger S is against differential cryptanalysis. The lower
bounds given by Corollaries 3.12 and 3.18 and by Remark 3.13 are given in Figure 3.8 for each
3 ≤ n ≤ 8.
Figure 3.8. Lower bounds for the linear (left) and differential (right) uniformities of S.
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Finally, it should be highlighted that these results can be used to easily prove that a given S-box
does not map any linear partition to another one. For instance, the linear and differential
uniformities of the S-box of Rijndeal [11] are far below the lower bounds given by Corollaries
3.12 and 3.18, no matter what the dimension d of the subspace V is. As a consequence, this S-
box does not map any linear partition to another linear one.
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Backdoored Encryption Algorithm 1
BEA-1 [28] (Backdoored Encryption Algorithm) is an AES-like cipher together with a backdoor based
on the theory developed in Chapters 2 and 3. This cipher is designed to resist linear and differential
cryptanalysis. Nonetheless, the backdoor enables recovery of the full 120-bit cipher key in just a
few seconds on a laptop computer using 216 chosen plaintext blocks, as presented in [29].
This chapter is organized as follows. First, the specification of the cipher BEA-1 and its security
analysis against linear and differential cryptanalysis are given in Section 1. Then, Section 2
explains the hidden property of the algorithm and its design. To conclude, the cryptanalysis
exploiting the backdoor is detailed in Sections 3 and 4.
1. Presentation of BEA-1
The cipher BEA-1 is directly inspired by Rijndael [7], the block cipher designed by Joan
Daemen and Vincent Rijmen, now known as the AES. Our algorithm encrypts 80-bit plaintext
blocks using a 120-bit cipher key. Unlike the AES, the internal state is not seen as a matrix of
bytes but as an array of 10-bit bundles. Therefore, the message and key spaces are respectively
ðF102 Þ
8 and ðF102 Þ
12.
1.1. Specification of the encryption process
The encryption consists in applying 11 times a simple keyed operation called round function to
the data block. A different 80-bit round key is used for each iteration of the round function.
Since the last round is slightly different and uses two round keys, the encryption requires twelve
80-bit round keys. These round keys are derived from the 120-bit cipher key using a key schedule.
Like any other substitution-permutation network, the round function is made up of three
stages: a key addition, a substitution layer and a diffusion layer.
• The key addition is just a bitwise “exclusive or” (XOR) between the data block and the
round key.
• The substitution layer consists in the parallel evaluation of four different 10-bit S-boxes
and is the only part of the cipher that is not affine. These S-boxes are referred to as S0, S1,
S2, S3 and are defined in Figures 5A, 7A, 9A and 11A given in Appendix. They should not
be confused with the secret S-boxes S0, S1, S2 and S3, only used in the design and the
cryptanalysis of BEA-1.
• Following the design principles of the AES, the diffusion layer comes in two parts: the
ShiftRows and the MixColumns operations. The first part is a bundle permutation. The
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second evaluates in parallel the linear transformation M : ðF102 Þ
4 ! ðF102 Þ
4 processing four
10-bit bundles. Because of its linearity, M is only defined over the standard basis of ðF102 Þ
4
in Figure 3A in Appendix. For convenience, its inverseM1 is also in the same figure.
The pseudo-codes for the key schedule and the encryption algorithm are both given in
Figure 4.1. To provide an overview of their structures, the first step of the key schedule and
Figure 4.1. The key schedule and the encryption function of BEA-1.
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the round function is illustrated in Figure 4.2. This representation also emphasizes the similar-
ities between our algorithm and the AES.
Remark 4.1. The decryption is straightforward from the encryption since all the primitives are
bijective. Thus, to decrypt, we just have to apply the inverse operations in the reverse order. It
should be stressed that the key addition and the ShiftRows are involutions; therefore the same
operations are used in the decryption process. Finally, note that the inverse S-boxes are not
given here but can be computed by using the equation S1i ðSðxÞÞ ¼ x holding for each x in F
10
2 .
Figure 4.2. Diagrammatic representations of the key schedule and the round function of BEA-1.
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1.2. Differential and linear cryptanalysis
In [7], Daemen and Rijmen introduced the differential and the linear branch numbers of a linear
transformation. With an exhaustive search, it can be checked that the differential and linear
branch numbers ofM are both equal to 5, which is the maximum. This implies that any 2-round
trail has at least 5 active S-boxes. Thus, a 10-round trail involves at least 25 active S-boxes.
Note that all the S-boxes are (at most) differentially 40-uniform and linearly 128-uniform.
Therefore, the probability of any 10-round differential trail is upper bounded by ð 401024Þ
25
≈
2116:9 and the absolute bias of a 10-round linear trail is upper bounded by ð128512Þ
25¼ 250.
Consequently, a differential cryptanalysis of the 10-round version of our cipher would require
at least 2117 chosen plaintext/ciphertext pairs and a linear cryptanalysis would require 2100
known plaintext/ciphertext pairs.
Even if this is a rough approximation since it does not take into account the inter-column
diffusion provided by the ShiftRows operation, it suffices to prove the cipher’s practical
resistance against classical differential and linear cryptanalysis. In fact, there are only 280
different plaintext/ciphertext pairs for a fixed cipher key.
2. Design of the backdoor
The presentation of secret structure of BEA-1 comes in two parts. First, Section 2.1 explains the
nature of this backdoor and provides all the results needed to address the cryptanalysis. Then,
the design of BEA-1’s primitives is given in Sections 2.2 and 2.3. The reader who just wants to
understand how the backdoor works can skip these two sections. Indeed, they are more
technical and are also independent of the remainder of this chapter.
2.1. The linear partitions throughout the encryption
As said in introduction, the backdoor of BEA-1 relies on the theoretical framework developed
in Chapters 2 and 3. Thus, it should not be surprising that linear partitions must play a key role
in it. For this purpose, let us introduce the following 5-dimensional subspaces of F102
V0 ¼ spanð266,343,3ED,354,17FÞ , W0 ¼ spanð16A,11B,306,05E,0B8Þ ,
V1 ¼ spanð398,229,34C,251,37BÞ , W1 ¼ spanð04B,3B7,0D5,027,2C8Þ ,
V2 ¼ spanð0BA,155,307,37E,318Þ , W2 ¼ spanð1A9,095,107,36F,2A3Þ ,
V3 ¼ spanð1D1,21E,134,0DC,15AÞ , W3 ¼ spanð0F0,2FE,191,332,1A6Þ :
Then, define the 40-dimensional subspaces V ¼ ∏7i¼0V i mod 4 andW ¼ ∏
7
i¼0W i mod 4 of message
space ðF102 Þ
8. Therefore, the linear partitions LðVÞ and LðWÞ are both made up with 240 cosets,
each containing 240 elements.
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The S-boxes S0, S1, S2 and S3 given in the specification of BEA-1 are actually derived from the
secret S-boxes S0, S1, S2 and S3 given in Figures 4A, 6A, 8A and 10A in Appendix. The relation
between the secret S-boxes Si and their modified versions Siwill be detailed later in Section 2.2.
In the first place, let us state the following theorem relating BEA-1 to the theory of partition-
based backdoor ciphers.
Theorem 4.2. Consider the encryption function of BEA-1 where the modified S-boxes S0, S1, S2,
and S3 are replaced with their secret counterparts S0, S1, S2, and S3. Then, the round function
preserves the linear partition LðVÞ of ðF102 Þ
8 and the last round maps LðVÞ to LðWÞ, no matter
the round keys used. As a consequence, the full encryption maps LðVÞ to LðWÞ.
More precisely, Figure 4.3 depicts the evolution of the linear partition LðVÞ throughout each
primitive of the (secret) encryption process. For instance, we can see that the S-box Si maps the
linear partition LðV iÞ to LðW iÞ, and hence, the substitution layer maps LðVÞ to LðWÞ. Simi-
larly, the diffusion layer comes back to the original partition, since it maps LðWÞ to LðVÞ.
Figure 4.3. The linear partitions throughout the encryption.
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Remark 4.3. Theorem 4.2, as well as Theorem 18 stated hereinafter, will be proven in Sections
2.2 and 2.3. Indeed, they establish the main properties of the backdoor and are hence closely
related to the design of the cipher’s primitives.
Thanks to Theorem 4.2, we can now explain our choices for the Vi andWi. Each of these subspaces
of F102 is a five-dimensional linear code whose minimal distance is equal to 4. This property
ensures that the Hamming distance of any two different elements lying in the same coset is at
least equal to 4. The subspaces V ndWof F802 inherit this property. Thus, if p is a plaintext, then any
other plaintext p0 lying in the same coset of V differs from p in at least four bits. Considering the
secret encryption function, Theorem 4.2 establishes that their ciphertexts c and c0 belong to the
same coset ofW. Thus, c and c0 have at least four different bits. As it will become clear in the next
two sections, the subspaces Vi andWi could have been freely chosen among the five-dimensional
subspaces of F102 . We surmised that using linear codes with high minimal distance should reduce
the likelihood of observing the backdoor by accident, hence our choice for the Vi andWi.
Having explained the main property of the secret encryption function, now is the time to
introduce the following theorem establishing a link between the secret cipher and BEA-1.
Theorem 4.4. Let F and E denote the round function and the encryption function of BEA-1
using the secret S-boxes. Let p ¼ p½0 be any plaintext. Define the following elements with
respect to the round keys k½0,…, k½10:
p½iþ1 ¼ Fk½iðp
½iÞ and p½iþ1 ¼ Fk½iðp
½iÞ for 0 ≤ i < 11 :
Assume that the round keys k[0],…,k[10] are independent and uniformly distributed. The prob-
ability that all the equalities p[i] = p[i] hold for each 1 ≤ i ≤ 11 is given by
944
1024
 6

925
1024
 2 !11
≈ 211 :
Therefore, the probability that p is encrypted equally with E and E can be approximated by 211.
Remark 4.5. The fact that the MixColumns operation is replaced with a key addition in the last
round of BEA-1 does not matter in Theorem 4.4. For the sake of simplicity, we then ignore this
detail. This explains why the last round key k[11] does not appear in the statement of this result.
Needless to say, the hypothesis that the round keys are independent and uniformly distributed
is mathematically wrong in any practical cryptanalysis. Indeed, the twelve 80-bit round keys
are all extracted from one 120-bit cipher key. However, the cipher key needs to have (at least)
960 bits to provide independence and uniform distribution to its round keys. Such a cipher key
must be related to the concept of long-key cipher defined in [30]. Nonetheless, if the cipher key
is uniformly distributed, the same applies for each round key.
In our cryptanalysis of BEA-1, we are given plaintexts with their ciphertexts encrypted under a
fixed cipher key. Even if we forget about the independence of the round keys, each plaintext
must be encrypted with a random cipher key to make use of Theorem 4.4.
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Fortunately, our experiments suggest that the proportion of the plaintexts encrypted equally
with EK and EK is approximatively 2
11, even when the round keys are derived from a fixed
cipher key K. To put it another way, if P is a subset of the plaintext space ðF102 Þ
8, it seems
reasonable to assume that
#{p∈PjEKðpÞ ¼ EKðpÞ} ≈
#P
211
: (4.1)
Now, suppose that P is included in a coset of V denoted by x + V. As the secret encryption
function EK maps LðVÞ to LðWÞ (see Theorem 4.2), we know that the image of P under EK is
included in a coset ofW. More precisely, Lemma 2.8 establishes that EKðPÞ is included in y +W
where y = EK(x). Hence,
{p∈PjEKðpÞ ¼ EKðpÞ} ⊆ {p∈PjEKðpÞ∈ ðyþWÞ} : (4.2)
Combining (4.1) with (4.2), we conclude that approximately #P  211 ciphertexts in C ¼ EkðPÞ
belong to y + W. In addition, we have observed that the ciphertexts c = EK(p) such that
EKðpÞ 6¼ EKðpÞ are spread over the 2
40 cosets ofW.
The backdoor of BEA-1 is hence the following. First, choose a set P of 216 plaintexts uniformly
chosen in one coset x + V and collect their ciphertexts C ¼ EKðPÞ encrypted under an unknown
cipher key K. Then search for the most represented coset of W in C and denote by y one of its
representatives. According to our experiments, this coset should have roughly 216–11 = 32
elements, and the second most represented coset is unlikely to have more than six elements.
As a consequence of the preceding discussion, we know that the coset x + V is mapped to y +W
by the secret encryption function EK. This information can then be used to recover the cipher
key K with a low computation cost, as detailed later in Sections 3 and 4.
To conclude this section, observe that no particular property of the key schedule has been used.
It can be proven that each round of the key schedule preserves the linear partition Lð
Q11
i¼0W iÞ,
provided that the S-boxes Si are replaced with their secret equivalents Si. This implies that if two
cipher keys K and K0 are in the same coset of
Q11
i¼0 W i, then we can approximate the probability
that each pair of round keys k[i] and k0[i] are in the same coset ofW by ð9443  925  240Þ7 ≈ 23:5.
However, for this property to be easily exploitable, the round keys ought to stay in the same
coset of V instead of W (which can be simply achieved by switching the mappings M and (S0|
S1|S2|S3) in the key schedule). Therefore, if compared with our cryptanalysis, this property
appears not to be very useful and was intentionally left as a wrong track.
2.2. The substitution layer
The nature of the hidden property of BEA-1 having been emphasized, this and the following
sections detail the design of the cipher’s primitives and prove Theorems 4.2 and 4.4 stated
above. As explained in introduction, these two sections are aimed at the reader who wants to
understand how BEA-1 was made. For a first read, it is possible to jump directly to Section 3
explaining the basic principle of the cryptanalysis using the backdoor.
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Let {0*} and {*0} denote respectively the subspaces {05} F
5
2 and F
5
2  {05} of F
10
2 . It should be
noted that {*0} is a complement space of {0*} in F102 . The design of each secret S-box Si rests on a
permutation S0i of F
10
2 preserving the linear partition Lð{0  }Þ. Following Theorem 3.5, we just
need to choose a permutation ρi of {*0} and a family ðτi,uÞu∈ {0} of permutations of {0*}. Then,
we define S0i for all x = u + v in F
10
2 by
S0iðxÞ ¼ S
0
iðuþ vÞ ¼ ρiðuÞ þ τi,uðvÞ ,
where u is in {*0} and v in {0*}. The permutations ρi and τi,uwere selected following the method
given in Section 3, in order to maximize the resistance of S0i against both differential and linear
cryptanalysis.
Figure 1A in Appendix defines the linear mappings LV i and LW i (for 0 ≤ i ≤ 4) over the standard
basis of F102 . It is worthwhile to note that these mappings are automorphisms of F
10
2 . Moreover,
LV ið{0  }Þ ¼ V i and LW ið{0  }Þ ¼ W i. By virtue of Proposition 2.15, we know that LV i maps
Lð{0  }Þ to LðV iÞ and that LW i maps Lð{0  }Þ to LðW iÞ. Last, but not least, define for each 0 ≤ i <
4 the secret S-box Si by
Si ¼ LW i ∘S
0
i ∘ ðLV iÞ
1 :
These S-boxes are given in Figures 4A, 6A, 8A and 10A in Appendix. Obviously, ðLV iÞ
1 maps
LðV iÞ to Lð{0  }Þ, then S
0
i preserves Lð{0  }Þ, and LW i maps Lð{0  }Þ to LðW iÞ. This implies the
following proposition.
Proposition 4.6. For each 0 ≤ i < 4, the secret S-box Si maps LðV iÞ to LðW iÞ.
Remark 4.7. If the reader is interested in an explicit definition of the permutations ρi and the
families of permutations ðτi,uÞi∈ {0}, they can be recovered in the following way. First, compute
S0i ¼ ðLW iÞ
1
∘Si ∘ LV i using the tables of Figures 1A and 4A (or 6A, 8A, 10A). As noted previously,
the permutation S0 i preserves the linear partition Lð{0  }Þ. To obtain its decomposition, we just
have to follow the proof of Theorem 3.5. Thus, for each u in {*0}, define ρi(u) as the unique element
of {  0}∪ðS0iðuÞ þ {0  }Þ. It is not hard to see that ρi(u) is simply equal to the element of F
10
2 , where
the five leftmost bits are exactly the ones of S0 iðuÞ and the five remaining bits are all zero. Finally,
for each u in {*0}, let τi,u be the permutation of {0*} defined by τi,uðvÞ ¼ S
0
iðuþ vÞ þ ρiðuÞ. Again,
τi,u(v) is just the 10-bit vector having its five leftmost bits all zero and its five rightmost bits
identical to the ones of S0iðuþ vÞ. Naturally, the permutations ρi and τi,u can be seen as permuta-
tions of F52 (instead of {*0} and {0*}) to obtain the more convenient definition
S0 iðu∥vÞ ¼ ðρiðuÞ∥τi,uðvÞÞ :
The modified S-boxes Si given in the specification of BEA-1 are such that Si(x) = Si(x) for almost
all input x in F102 . For instance, S0ðxÞ ¼ S0ðxÞ for all except 80 elements x in F
10
2 . The images of
these 80 particular points are emphasized in Figures 4A and 5A. These modifications were
chosen so as to improve the differential and linear resistances of S0 compared to the original
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secret S-box S0. More generally, Si and Si have 80 different images for i in {0,1,2}. The last-
modified S-box S3 is less close to it secret equivalent since S3 and S3 have 99 different images.
Consequently, if x is uniformly distributed over F102 , then the equality Si(x) = Si(x) holds with
probability qi where
q0 ¼ q1 ¼ q2 ¼
944
1024
and q3 ¼
925
1024
:
This implies that when x is uniformly distributed over ðF102 Þ
8, the images of x under the secret
and the modified substitution layers are equal with probability q ¼ ð
Q3
i¼0 qiÞ
2.
Let p = p[0] be a plaintext. In the following, we use the notations of Theorem 4.4. If k[i] is
uniformly distributed, then so is p[i] + k[i]. Thus, p½iþ1 ¼ Fk½iðp
½iÞ is equal to p½iþ1 ¼ Fk½iðp
½iÞwith
probability q. Assuming moreover that the round keys are independent implies that the events
p[i] = p[i] for each 1 ≤ i ≤ 11 are independent. Therefore, the probability that the equalities p[i] =
p[i] hold for all 1 ≤ i ≤ 11 is given by q11. This discussion proves Theorem 4.4.
2.3. The diffusion layer
Some components used to design the linear transformation M are defined over the finite field
F25 . In order to have an explicit construction of this field, we consider the irreducible polyno-
mial X5 + X2 + 1 over F2 and define F25 as the quotient ring F2½X=ðX
5 þ X2 þ 1Þ. Let α denote
the equivalence class of X in F25 . By construction, the equality α
5 þ α2 þ 1 ¼ 0 holds, or
equivalently, α5 ¼ α2 þ 1. Each element of F25 can hence be uniquely written as
X4
i¼0
xiα
i
where (x4,…, x0) belongs to F
5
2. More precisely, the family ðα
iÞi<5 is a basis of F25 seen as a 5-
dimensional vector space over F2. The field F25 will then be identified with ðF2Þ
5 via the
isomorphism from F52 to F25 mapping (x4,…, x0) to
X4
i¼0
xiα
i. For instance, the element α2 + α
+ 1 in F25 is identified with 07 in F
5
2. Now define the 4  4 matricesMU and MV over F25 by
a b c d
b a d c
c d a b
d c b a
0
BBBB@
1
CCCCA MU :
a ¼ α4 þ α2,
b ¼ α4 þ α3 þ α2 þ αþ 1,
c ¼ α3 þ α2,
d ¼ α4 þ α2 þ 1,
MV :
a ¼ α3 þ α2 þ 1,
b ¼ α4 þ α3 þ α2 þ α,
c ¼ α4 þ α2 þ α
d ¼ α3:
8>>><
>>>>:
8>>><
>>>>:
It can be verified that these matrices are MDS. In other words, the [8, 4]-linear code having
G ¼ ½Id4,MU as generator matrix has minimal distance equals to 5, which is the maximum
achievable.
Each of these matrices naturally induces an automorphism of ðF25Þ
4 and hence of ðF102 Þ
4. For
instance, MU maps the element x ¼ ðx0, x1, x2, x3Þ to x  MU. Observe that we chose to see
elements of ðF102 Þ
4 as row vectors to keep the common notations of linear codes.
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Example 4.8. To illustrate these notations, let us compute the image of the element
x ¼ ð00,02,00,00Þ of ðF102 Þ
4 under the automorphism induced by MU. First, x is identified
with the element (0, α, 0, 0) of ðF25Þ
4. Then,
ð0;α; 0; 0Þ MU ¼ ðαðα
4 þ α3 þ α2 þ αþ 1Þ,αðα4 þ α2Þ,αðα4 þ α2 þ 1Þ,αðα3 þ α2ÞÞ
¼ ðα5 þ α4 þ α3 þ α2 þ α, α5 þ α3, α5 þ α3 þ α, α4 þ α3Þ
¼ ðα4 þ α3 þ αþ 1,α3 þ α2 þ 1,α3 þ α2 þ αþ 1, α4 þ α3Þ:
Therefore, ð00,02,00,00Þ MU ¼ ð1B,0D,0F,18Þ. ▴
As was the case for the secret S-boxes Si, the linear transformation M rests upon the linear
transformation M0 defined as follows
M0 : ðF102 Þ
4 ! ðF102 Þ
4
ðui ∥ viÞi<4 ↦ ðρðuÞi ∥ τuðvÞiÞi<4
where ρðuÞ ¼ uMU and τuðvÞ ¼ vMV þ PU!VðuÞ. The strength of this construction is that
M0 inherits the linear and differential branch numbers of MU and MV, as stated in the proposi-
tion hereunder. But first, we introduce the following example.
Example 4.9. Let us compute the image of x ¼ ð000,070,000,000Þ under M0. As a first step,
observe that x can be written as
x ¼ ð00∥00,03∥10,00∥00,00∥00Þ ¼ ðui∥viÞi<4 ,
where u ¼ ð00,03,00,00Þ and v ¼ ð00,10,00,00Þ. Let e9 ¼ ð00,02,00,00Þ and
e10 ¼ ð00,01,00,00Þ. Then u ¼ e9 þ e10, it is indeed its decomposition over the standard basis
of ðF52Þ
4. Thus, for any linear mapping L, it holds that LðuÞ ¼ Lðe9Þ þ Lðe10Þ. The image of u
under ρ can hence be computed by
ρðuÞ ¼ ρðe9Þ þ ρðe10Þ ¼ ð1B,0D,0F,18Þ þ ð1F,14,15,0CÞ ¼ ð04,19,1A,14Þ :
In the same way,
τuðvÞ ¼ vMV þ PU!Vðe9Þ þ PU!Vðe10Þ
¼ ð16,0E,14,02Þ þ ð0F,11,0C,16Þ þ ð11,0E,02,0AÞ ¼ ð08,11,1A,1EÞ :
Consequently,M0ðxÞ ¼ ð04 ∥ 08,19 ∥ 11,1A ∥ 1A,14 ∥ 1EÞ ¼ ð088,331,35A,29EÞ. ▴
Proposition 4.10. The linear and the differential branch numbers of M0 are both equal to 5.
Thus, M0 is a perfect diffusion layer.
Proof. Let x ¼ ðui ∥ viÞi<4 be a nonzero element of ðF
10
2 Þ
4. In order to prove that the differential
branch number of M0 is equal to 5, we need to show that w10ðxÞ þw10ðM
0ðxÞÞ is greater than
or equal to 5. First, assume that u ¼ ðuiÞi<4 is nonzero. Using the fact that MU is MDS, we
obtain the inequality w5ðuÞ þw5ðuMUÞ ≥ 5. Next,
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5 ≤w5ðuÞ þw5ðρðuÞÞ ¼ w10ððui ∥ 0Þi<4Þ þw10ððρðuÞi ∥ 0Þi<4Þ
≤w10ððui ∥ viÞi<4Þ þw10ððρððuÞi ∥ τuðvÞiÞi<4Þ ¼ w10ðxÞ þw10ðM
0ðxÞÞ:
Now, suppose that u = 0. It must be the case that v 6¼ 0 as x is nonzero by definition. Again, it
holds that w5ðvÞ þw5ðvMVÞ ≥ 5 because MV is also MDS. Then,
5 ≤w5ðvÞ þw5ðτ0ðvÞÞ ¼ w10ðð0 ∥ viÞi<4Þ þw10ðð0 ∥ τ0ðvÞiÞi<4Þ
¼ w10ðxÞ þw10ðM
0ðxÞÞ:
We have proven that w10ðxÞ þw10ðM
0ðxÞÞ ≥ 5 for any nonzero element x of ðF102 Þ
4. Conse-
quently, the differential branch number of M0 is greater than or equal to 5. The equality
BDðM
0Þ ¼ 5 follows as 5 is the maximum achievable. Similarly, it can be proven that M0 has
also the maximum linear branch number. It follows that M0 is a perfect diffusion layer and the
result is proven. ▪
Recall that the notation {0*} denotes the subspace {05} F
5
2 and that the linear mappings LV i
and LW i (see Figure 1A) map respectively Lð{0  }Þ to LðV iÞ and Lð{0  }Þ to LðW iÞ. It is then
easily seen that M0 maps {0*}4 to itself. Thus, M0 preserves the partition Lð{0  }4Þ by Proposi-
tion 2.15. Finally, define
M ¼ ðLV0 ∥ LV1 ∥ LV2 ∥ LV3Þ ∘M
0 ∘ ðLW0 ∥ LW1 ∥ LW2 ∥ LW3 Þ
1 :
From its definition, it is straightforward to check that M maps the linear partition Lð
Q3
i¼0 W iÞ
to Lð
Q3
i¼0 V iÞ.
Example 4.11. We are going to compute Mð000,080,000,000Þ. First, we have that
ðLW0 ∥ LW1 ∥ LW2 ∥ LW3 Þ
1ð000,080,000,000Þ
¼ ðL1W0ð000Þ, L
1
W1
ð080Þ, L1W2ð000Þ, L
1
W3
ð000ÞÞ ¼ ð000,070,000,000Þ :
Then, the image of ð000,070,000,000Þ under M0 is ð088,331,35A,29EÞ, as already
established in Example 4.9. Finally,
Mð000,080,000,000Þ ¼ ðLV0 ∥ LV1 ∥ LV2 ∥ LV3Þð088,331,35A,29EÞ
¼ ð15E,0BF,1E2,04FÞ :
Indeed, LV0ð088Þ ¼ LV0ð080Þ þ LV0ð008Þ ¼ 21Dþ 343 ¼ 15E. The three other bundles are
computed in the same manner. ▴
Because each mapping LV i or LW i operates on different bundles and is invertible, it is clear that
the linear and differential branch numbers ofM are the same asM0. This discussion completes
the proof of the following corollary.
Corollary 4.12. The linear mapping M is a perfect diffusion layer, which maps Lð
Q3
i¼0 W iÞ to
Lð
Q3
i¼0 V iÞ.
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In conclusion, Proposition 2.13 ensures that any key addition preserves all the linear partitions,
and hence it preserves LðVÞ. Next, it has been proven in Section 2.2 that every secret S-box Si
maps LðV iÞ to LðW iÞ. Thus, the secret substitution layer maps LðVÞ to LðWÞ. It is clear that the
ShiftRows operation is linear and maps W to itself. According to Proposition 2.15, this
mapping preserves LðWÞ. Finally, the MixColumn operation maps LðWÞ to LðVÞ by Corollary
4.12. This discussion is summarized in Figure 4.3 and proves Theorem 4.2 previously given in
Section 2.1.
3. Main idea of the cryptanalysis
As we have seen in Section 2.1, the cipher BEA-1 does not map a linear partition to another one
but behaves as though it did for a nonnegligible fraction of the message space. This nontrivial
property can be used to recover the cipher key in an operational cryptanalysis. But before
considering the full cipher, we give the main idea of this attack.
3.1. A detailed example
To explain how to take advantage of this backdoor, we introduce a toy example. First, let us
mention that all the notations of this section are independent of the remainder of this chapter.
The message space of this toy cipher is simply F62. Then, consider the subspaces V and W of F
6
2
defined by
V ¼ spanð01,02,10,20Þ ¼ {ðx3, x2; 0; 0;x1, x0Þjx∈F
4
2} ,
W ¼ spanð01,02,04,10Þ ¼ {ð0;x3; 0;x2, x1, x0Þjx∈F
4
2} :
Thus, LðVÞ ¼ {xþ Vjx∈ {00,04,08,0C}} and LðWÞ ¼ {yþW jy∈ {00,08,20,28}}.
Let S be the permutation of F62 given in Figure 4.4. We defined another permutation S of F
6
2
satisfying S(x) = S(x) for any input x in F62 except 00, 01, 04, 05, 08, 09, 0C and 0D. The
images of these eight specific points under S are also given in Figure 4.4. By analogy with
Section 2, the permutation S represents the secret S-box used to design the trapdoor whereas S
represents the modified S-box given in the specification of the algorithm. Lastly, define the
following keyed mappings
Figure 4.4. The theoretical and the modified S-boxes.
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Fk : F
6
2 ! F
6
2 Fk : F
6
2 ! F
6
2
x↦SðxÞ þ k , x↦ SðxÞ þ k ,
representing respectively the secret and the modified round functions. Naturally, the key k can
be any element of F62.
It can be easily verified that the secret S-box Smaps LðVÞ to LðWÞ. In fact, we have that
Sð00þ VÞ ¼ 08þW , Sð08þ VÞ ¼ 00þW ,
Sð04þ VÞ ¼ 28þW , Sð0Cþ VÞ ¼ 20þW :
In contrast with the secret permutation S, the modified S-box S does not map LðVÞ to LðWÞ.
However, the equality S(x) = S(x) holds with probability 56=64 assuming that x is uniformly
distributed over F62. This can be stated equivalently as
#{x∈F62jSðxÞ ¼ SðxÞ} ¼ 2
6  8 ¼ 56 :
It should also be noted that this statement remains valid when considering their inverse
mappings, that is #{y∈F62 j S
1ðyÞ ¼ S1ðyÞ} ¼ 56. Indeed, if x is an element of F62 such that
S(x) = S(x), then y = S(x) satisfies the equality S1(x) = S1(y). As a consequence,
#{x∈F62jSðxÞ ¼ SðxÞ} ≤ #{y∈F
6
2 j S
1ðyÞ ¼ S1ðyÞ} :
The converse inequality can be proven in the same way, establishing the equality.
Now, consider the subset P of F62 defined hereinafter. We assume that the round key is k = 37.
The image of P under S and its encryption with F37 are given below.
It should be stressed that the coset 04 + V is significantly more represented in P than any other
coset of V. Since F37ðPÞmaps the linear partition LðVÞ to LðWÞ, the messages belonging to the
same coset of V are all mapped to the same coset ofW. Therefore, the most represented coset of
W in F37ðPÞ has also ten elements.
As we have seen above, the modified round function F37 does not map LðVÞ to LðWÞ.
Figure 4.5 displays the differences between the encryption of P with F37 and its encryption
with F37 by highlighting the messages x in P such that S(x) 6¼ S(x) (that is 04, 05, and 0D) and
their images throughout the encryption.
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To explain these differences, let us first consider the set Q of the ten messages lying in both P
and 04 + V. Knowing that the equality S(x) = S(x) holds with probability 56= 64 when x is
uniformly distributed, it seems reasonable to assume that only 1056= 64 ¼ 8:75 messages of
Qwill remain in the same coset when computing their images under S. By comparing with the
actual messages in Q, we can see that this is a good approximation since eight messages in
SðQÞ belong to the same coset ofW.
Needless to say, there are also eight messages in F37ðQÞ lying in the same coset of W because
the key addition preserves LðWÞ.
We focus now to the set P as a whole. According to the discussion above, we know that the
most represented coset ofW in F37ðPÞ has at least eight elements. We have seen that the images
under S of messages lying in the same coset may not stay together. Nonetheless, the converse
can also be true, and messages in different cosets may end up in the same coset. This is exactly
what happens with the message 0D, as illustrated in Figure 4.5. Consequently, the most
represented coset in F37ðPÞ has actually nine elements.
Figure 4.5. Encryption with F37 and F37.
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The fact that the most represented coset may not only lose but occasionally retrieve elements
should be seen as a side effect. Its impact remains low when
• one coset has significantly more elements than all other cosets (say at least 5 times more), and
• when the number of messages is lower than the total number of cosets.
We must nevertheless keep this fact in mind to understand why the right key will not neces-
sarily have the best score.
It is now time to explain how to recover the round key using only the set C ¼ F37ðPÞ of
encrypted messages. First, we have to determine the most represented coset in C. In our
example, this coset is 08 +W with nine messages, and u = 08 is one of its representatives.
Now, assume that k is the round key used to encrypt C. We need to find the coset of V which is
mapped to u + W by the secret round function Fk. According to Lemma 2.8, Fk maps t + V to
Fk(t) + W. A representative of this coset of V is then t = S
1(u + k). Finally, the score of the
guessed key k is the number of messages F1k ðcÞ ¼ S
1ðcþ kÞ that belong to the theoretical
coset t + V, that is to say
scoreðkÞ ¼ #{c∈CjS1ðcþ kÞ∈ ðtþ VÞ} :
Figure 4.6 illustrates the scoring process applied to the right key (37) and to a wrong key (07).
We naturally recover the set P and the coset tþ V ¼ 34þ V ¼ 04þ V when using the right
Figure 4.6. Decryption with the right key and with a wrong key.
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key. Thus, the score of k = 37 is equal to 10. In the same way, the score of k = 07 is the number of
decrypted messages in the coset tþ V ¼ 32þ V ¼ 00þ V, so scoreð07Þ ¼ 8.
Let us now explain why a wrong key tends to have a lower score than the right key. First, the
addition of the wrong key randomizes the cosets and the messages within. Recall that when
the input x is uniformly distributed, the equality S1(x) = S1(x) holds with probability 56=64.
The most represented coset after the addition of the wrong key should then lose some elements
by applying S1. Thus, the score of any wrong key should be lower than or equal to 8.
It goes without saying that the previous discussion gives just the main idea of the cryptanaly-
sis. For some wrong keys, the side effects are significant, and their scores can even be higher
than the score of the right key, as shown in Figure 4.7. Indeed, the key 37 is one the four best
keys but is not the one that has the highest score (0B). For this reason, we will not only return
the best key but also the NbCand candidate keys having the highest scores when running this
cryptanalysis.
3.2. Formalization of the attack
The aim of this section is to formalize and to generalize the cryptanalysis introduced previ-
ously in Section 3.1. As we have just seen, this attack really begins in Figure 4.6. The very first
data needed is the set C containing the encrypted messages under the unknown key, given by
C ¼ {04,05,06,0D,0F,15,16,17,18,22,27,34,35,36,3A} :
Naturally, C is included in the set c ¼ F62 of all possible ciphertexts. Similarly, the set of all
possible round keys is denoted byk ¼ F62. Next, define the keyed mapping
G :k c! F62
ðk, cÞ↦S1ðcþ kÞ :
Each mapping Gk : c↦Gðk, cÞ is the inverse of the round function Fk. The secret counterpart of
G is G : ðk, cÞ↦S1ðcþ kÞ. Observe that for each round key k, the mapping Gk maps LðWÞ to
Figure 4.7. The scores for each key.
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LðVÞ. It is also necessary to know the most represented coset u +W in C. Using these notations,
the cryptanalysis is formalized in Algorithm 3. Finally, to include potential information on the
round keys, this attack processes only a subset K ofk.
More generally, the parameters can be outlined as follows.
• The sets of all possible keys and ciphertexts are referred to ask and c.
• The keyed mapping G :k c! E typically undoes (or partially undoes) one or two
rounds of the encryption process.
• Its secret counterpart is denoted by G :k c! E. It is assumed that Gk maps a linear
partition LðWÞ to another partition LðVÞ no matter the key k used.
• The set of the given ciphertexts is denoted by C. The set of the keys that must be scored by
this attack is denoted by K.
• It is assumed that there is a coset of W containing significantly more ciphertexts than any
other coset. The element u of c is a representative of this coset.
• Finally, NbCand is the number of candidate keys to return.
Remark 4.13. Taking a closer look at Algorithm 3, we can see that the structure Cand requires
an efficient way to remove the lowest scored key. In our implementation, Cand is a sorted
array of couples (s, L) where L is a list containing the keys having the score s. Since there are
very few different scores, the sorted insertion in Cand is (almost) in constant time. Removing
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the lowest scored key is also in constant time. Thus, the time complexity of this cryptanalysis is
Oð#K #CÞ.
4. Cryptanalysis of BEA-1 using the backdoor
The algorithm SelectKeys (see Algorithm 3) detailed into the previous section enables
recovery of information on the last round key, using the fact that the round function acts as a
function mapping a linear partition to another one with high probability. In this section, we
explain how this algorithm can be used to recover the full 120-bit cipher key in just a few
seconds on a laptop computer.
This cryptanalysis requires N = 216 chosen plaintexts and their corresponding ciphertexts
encrypted under one unknown cipher key K. As BEA-1 operates on 80-bit blocks, this amounts
to 2  640 KiB of data. The plaintexts only need to be uniformly chosen in one coset of V, and
there is no requirement on the cipher key.
Our cryptanalysis is naturally divided in five distinct parts. First, we give a brief overview of
each part. By hypothesis, all the plaintexts are in the same coset of V. As explained in Section
2.1, a coset of W should be more represented among the ciphertexts. The first part is aimed at
finding a representative u of this coset. The second part consists in using the algorithm
SelectKeys to find 215 candidates for the full 80-bit last round key k[11]. Next, relying on a
property of the key schedule, SelectKeys is applied to these 215 candidates to find the right
last key in a third part. So far, we have recovered 80 bits of the cipher key. Knowing the last
round key, it is then possible to undo the last round of each ciphertext. The fourth part is really
close to the first one and provides 215 candidates for the 40 remaining bits. Finally, deduce the
215 candidate cipher keys from k[11] and the preceding candidates. The last part involves testing
these cipher keys on the plaintext/ciphertext pairs available to find the right one.
The presentation of our cryptanalysis is structured as follows. First, we provide the full
attack in Algorithm 4. Then, each part of this algorithm is detailed in one dedicated section.
It should be noted that we keep the notations of Section 2 (and not those of Section 3) in
the remainder of this chapter. This work has been presented at the RusKrypto 2017 confer-
ence [31].
4.1. Part 1: finding the right output coset
Let P denote the set of the 216 plaintexts uniformly chosen in one coset of V and let
C ¼ {EKðpÞjp∈P} denote the set of their ciphertexts. As said previously, we first need to find
the most represented coset of W in C. Let Ui be the subspace of F
10
2 defined by Ui ¼ LW ið{  0}Þ
for each 0 ≤ i < 3. Since {*0} is a complement space of {0*} and LW i is an automorphism, we
know that Ui is a complement space of LW ið{0  }Þ ¼ W i. Define U as the subspace
Q7
i¼0Ui mod 4
of ðF102 Þ
8. Of course, U is a complement space ofW.
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Let c be a ciphertext and u ¼ ðuiÞi<8 be in U. Because both U and W are product spaces, it is
easily seen that u is the unique representative in U of the coset c +W if, and only if, ci and ui are
in the same coset ofWimod4 for each i < 8. We deduce the following efficient way to compute the
representative in U of the coset c + W. First, precompute the four tables RepWi such that, for
each x in F102 , RepWi½x gives the representative in Ui of x + Wi. These tables are just arrays of
1024 integers. Then, the representative of c ¼ ðciÞi<8 is just u ¼ ðRepWi mod 4½ciÞi<8.
To find the most represented coset of W in C, we first compute the representative in U of each
ciphertext as described above. Then, we search for the representative that occurs the most. Any
naive algorithm should work since there are only 215 representatives.
4.2. Part 2: obtaining candidates for the last round key
This part is intended to find candidates for the last round key k[11] using the algorithm
SelectKeys (see Algorithm 3) to undo the last round of BEA-1. However, if this algorithm is
naively applied, then the last round has to be undone for each of the 216 ciphertexts and 280
possible values of k[11], yielding an order of 296 time complexity.
To solve this problem, the 215 candidates for k[11] are obtained bundle by bundle, as illustrated
in Figure 4.8. First, we partially decrypt the bundles of index 3 and 7. We begin by these
Figure 4.8. Cryptanalysis using the backdoor (Part 2).
Partition-based Trapdoor Ciphers62
bundles since they both involve the S-box S3, being the most different from its secret equiva-
lent. Following the notations of SelectKeys, the set containing the ciphertexts is
C{3;7} ¼ {ðc3, c7Þjc∈ C}, and the set of the keys is K{3;7} ¼ {ðk3, k7Þjk3, k7 ∈F
10
2 }. The mapping used
to partially decrypt the last round of these ciphertexts is
G{3;7} : ðF
10
2 Þ
2  ðF102 Þ
2 ! ðF102 Þ
2
ððk3, k7Þ, ðc3, c7ÞÞ↦ ðS
1
3 ðc3 þ k3Þ, S
1
3 ðc7 þ k7ÞÞ :
Its secret equivalent G{3,7} is obtained by replacing S3 with S3. The two remaining inputs of the
algorithm are the representative u = (u3, u7) of the most represented coset of (W3)
2, and the
subspace (V3)
2 of ðF102 Þ
2. It is worth observing thatG{3,7}maps LððW3Þ
2Þ to LððV3Þ
2Þ as required
by the algorithm. Running SelectKeys with these arguments generates a set Cand
containing 215 candidates for ðk3
½11, k7
½11Þ instead of 220.
From now on, each step seeks to add a new bundle to our candidates for the last round key
k[11]. The next bundle to add has index 0. Let E denote the set {0, 3, 7} of the current bundle’s
indices. Since we have no information on the value of k0
½11, the set of the possible values for
ðki
½11Þi∈E is
KE ¼ {ðkiÞi∈Ejk0 ∈F
10
2 , ðk3, k7Þ∈Cand} :
Following the idea of the first step, we define CE ¼ {ðciÞi∈EjðciÞi<8 ∈ C} and
GE : ðF
10
2 Þ
E  ðF102 ÞE ! ðF
10
2 ÞE
ððkiÞi∈E, ðciÞi∈EÞ↦ ðS1i mod 4ðciþkiÞÞi∈E
:
Then, define GE by replacing Si with Si and let VE denote the subspace
Q
i∈E V i mod 4 of ðF
10
2 Þ
E.
The set Cand obtained by running SelectKeyswith these parameters contains 215 candidates
for ðk0
½11, k3
½11, k7
½11Þ.
According to Algorithm 4, the index of the next bundle is 4. Actually, the order of the bundle’s
indices was chosen such as to involve the S-boxes S3, then S0, S1 and finally S2. The current
indices are in the set E ¼ {0; 3; 4; 7}. Similarly, we define
KE ¼ {ðkiÞi∈Ejk4 ∈F
10
2 , ðk0, k3, k7Þ∈Cand}
to include the information on k[11] gathered by the previous step. Finally, define CE, GE,GE and
VE as above. Again, the algorithm SelectKeys yields 2
15 candidates for ðki
½11Þi∈E.
This time, let us take a closer look at the implementation of this step. Because #KE¼ 2
25 and
#CE¼ 2
16, a straightforward implementation of SelectKeys requires 241 partial round
decryptions, as explained by Remark 4.13. Algorithm 5 provides our implementation of
SelectKeys for this step. As we can see, the previous candidates are used to filter the
ciphertexts before attacking k4 by brute force. For each of the 2
15 candidates, initializing the
Partition-Based Trapdoor Ciphers
http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.70420
63
filter requires 216 partial decryptions. On average, it remains roughly 26 ciphertexts after the
filtering process. The loop over k4 hence requires 2
16 partial decryptions. Consequently, this
implementation performs about 232 partial decryptions instead of 241.
Naturally, the 215 candidates for the full round key k[11] are obtained by repeating this method
for the four remaining bundles. We will conclude by observing that the complexity of each step
decreases since the filtering process improves as the algorithm progresses.
4.3. Part 3: finding the last round key
So far, we have found 215 candidates for the 80-bit key k[11]. This part intends to recover the
right key among these candidates, relying on the key schedule’s structure. Let us consider the
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last round of the key schedule in order to derive a relation between k[10] and k[11]. In
Figure 4.2:
• k½9 ¼ ðk0
½9,…, k7
½9Þ corresponds with ðk0,…, k7Þ,
• k½10 ¼ ðk0
½10,…, k7
½10Þ corresponds with ðk8,…, k15Þ,
• k½11 ¼ ðk0
½11,…, k7
½11Þ corresponds with ðk16,…, k23Þ.
It is then easily seen that
ðk
½10
0 , k
½10
1 , k
½10
2 , k
½10
3 Þ ¼ ðk
½11
0 , k
½11
1 , k
½11
2 , k
½11
3 Þ þ ðk
½11
4 , k
½11
5 , k
½11
6 , k
½11
7 Þ :
Thus, the 40 leftmost bits of k[10] are determined by k[11]. Using this equality, it is possible to
partially decrypt the last two rounds for every candidate for k[11]. Again, the algorithm
SelectKeys is used to distinguish between candidates.
Instead of wasting time understanding the definition of G stated hereinafter, we encourage the
reader to compare it with Figure 4.9, which speaks for itself. Let us consider
Figure 4.9. Cryptanalysis using the backdoor (Part 3).
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G0 : ðF102 Þ
8  ðF102 Þ{0; 2; 5; 7}↦ ðF
10
2 Þ4
ððkiÞi<8, ðciÞi∈ {0;2;5;7}Þ↦ ðS
1
0 ðc0 þ k0Þ þ k0 þ k4, S
1
1 ðc5 þ k5Þ þ k1 þ k5,
S12 ðc2 þ k2Þ þ k2 þ k6, S
1
3 ðc7 þ k7Þ þ k3 þ k7Þ :
Then, let G be the mapping from ðF102 Þ
8  ðF102 Þ
{0;2;5;7} to ðF102 Þ
4 given by
G ¼ ðS0 ∥ S1 ∥ S2 ∥ S3Þ
1
∘M1 ∘G0 :
Define G in the same way as before and let V 0 ¼
Q3
i¼0 V i. Finally, run Selectkeys as in line
12 of Algorithm 4. The candidate that has the highest score is then the last round key k[11].
To explain why Parts 2 and 3 of this cryptanalysis are complementary, let us take a closer look
at the 215 candidates obtained previously. Most of them are in fact really close to k[11]; more
precisely, they have at most three bundles different from k[11]. This observation is not surpris-
ing because when decrypting the last round, each bundle of the key affects only one bundle of
the output. As a direct consequence, close candidates give rise to close one-round decrypted
ciphertexts. This explains why the algorithm SelectKeys, as used in Part 2, may assign
similar scores to close candidates.
By contrast, the mapping G defined above yields very different outputs when used with close
candidate keys. Such a property comes from the high diffusion provided by M1. Thus, this
part is more effective where the previous part has its main weakness. Moreover, the side effects
are limited here since we decrypt two rounds instead of one.
4.4. Part 4: obtaining candidates for the remaining bits
The round function of the key schedule being bijective, it is sufficient to know the 120 output bits
of the last round to compute the cipher key. Until now, we have recovered the last round key k[11],
accounting for 80 of these 120 bits. The 40 remaining bits are the 40 rightmost bits of k[10], also
denoted by ðki
½10Þ4 ≤ i<8. This fourth part intends to find 2
15 candidates for these unknown bits.
Since the key k[11] is now known, it is possible to undo the last round for every ciphertext. The
cryptanalysis is then reduced to the attack of the second to last round. However, the method
used in Part 2 cannot be directly applied here since the second to last round involves the MDS
mapping M. Let x and k be elements of ðF102 Þ
4 and observe that
MðxÞ þ k ¼ MðxÞ þMðM1ðkÞÞ ¼ MðxþM1ðkÞÞ ¼ Mðxþ k0Þ
where k0 ¼ M1ðkÞ. Thus, the key addition and the mapping M can be switched provided that
the key is replaced. According to this observation, define
ðki0
½10Þ4 ≤ i<8 ¼ M
1ððki
½10Þ4 ≤ i<8Þ :
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Therefore, the last two rounds of BEA-1 can equivalently be represented as in Figure 4.10.
Thanks to this representation, candidates for the key ðk0 i
½10Þ4 ≤ i<8 can be obtained using
SelectKeys as in Part 2. To this end, we first need to partially undo the last round using
k[11]. Following Figure 4.10, define
f : ðF102 Þ
{1;3;4;6} ! ðF102 Þ4
ðciÞi∈ {1; 3; 4; 6}↦M
1ðS10 ðc4 þ k4
½11Þ, S11 ðc1 þ k1
½11Þ,
S12 ðc6 þ k6
½11Þ, S13 ðc3 þ k3
½11ÞÞ :
The set {f ððciÞi∈ {1;3;4;6}Þjc∈ C} of these “new” ciphertexts is denoted by C
0, and the corresponding
coset representative is u0 ¼ fððuiÞi∈ {1;3;4;6}Þ. To be more consistent with Figure 4.10, the bundles
of u0 and of the elements of C0 are indexed from 4 to 7 included. The remainder of the attack is
similar to Part 2 as the candidates are obtained bundle by bundle. The first step gets candidates
for the bundle’s indices 4 and 7. The second and the third steps add the indices 5 and 6,
respectively. If E denotes the set of the current bundle’s indices, then the parameters of
SelectKeys are the set C0E ¼ {ðc
0
iÞi∈Ejðc
0
iÞ4 ≤ i<8 ∈ C
0}, the mapping
Figure 4.10. Cryptanalysis using the backdoor (Part 4).
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GE : ðF
10
2 Þ
E  ðF102 ÞE ! ðF
10
2 Þ
E
ððk0 iÞi∈E, ðc
0
iÞi∈EÞ↦ ðS
1
i mod 4ðc
0
i þ k
0
iÞÞi∈E ,
its equivalentGE and the subspace VE ¼
Y
i∈E
V i mod 4 of ðF
10
2 Þ
E. The other details are given in
Algorithm 4. At the end of this part, every candidate k0 ¼ ðk0iÞ4 ≤ i<8 for ðk
0
i
½10Þ4 ≤ i<8 gives rise to
a candidate k ¼ Mðk0Þ for ðki
½10Þ4 ≤ i<8.
4.5. Part 5: deducing the cipher key
Concatenating the candidates for ðki
½10Þ4 ≤ i<8 with k
[11] yields 215 candidates for the output of
the key schedule’s last round. To obtain the corresponding candidates for the cipher key, we
need to reverse the rounds of the key schedule.
Referring to Figure 4.2, the ith round of the key schedule maps the element (X0, X1, X2) of
ðF402 Þ
3 to (Y0, Y1, Y2) according to the following equalities
Y0 ¼ X0 þ f iðX2Þ , Y1 ¼ Y0 þ X1 , Y2 ¼ Y1 þ X2 ,
where fi denotes the permutation of ðF
10
2 Þ
4 defined for each X by
f iðXÞ ¼ ð3
i mod 210; 0; 0; 0Þ þ ðS0 ∥ S1 ∥ S2 ∥ S3Þ ∘MðXÞ :
Using these notations, it easily seen that
X0 ¼ Y0 þ f iðY1 þ Y2Þ , X1 ¼ Y0 þ Y1 , X2 ¼ Y1 þ Y2 :
These equalities describe how to reverse each round of the key schedule, and thus how to
recover the 215 candidate cipher keys.
Finally, it just remains to test these candidate cipher keys to complete the cryptanalysis. To be
efficient, choose one plaintext/ciphertext pair (p, c) and check whether or not the encryption of
p under the candidate K is equal to c. In case of equality, repeat this process for all pairs
available to prevent false positive results. Otherwise, the candidate is discarded. Obviously,
the right cipher key is the one that passes all tests.
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Conclusion
In this book, we have addressed the following issue: “is it possible to design a mathematical
backdoor which would rely mostly on suitable partitionning techniques of the plaintext and
ciphertext spaces, independently of the round keys?”. We had in mind initially to exploit
combinatorial properties of the core primitives.
The overall conclusion we get is that if we want to design such a backdoor, the only solution is
to stay in the algebraic domain and no specifically combinatorial tools or primitive are possi-
ble. Let us summarize in details the main results.
If we wish to design any encryption system that maps any partition A of the plaintexts to a
partition B of the ciphertexts, independently of the round keys then
• the round function must map a linear partition to another one, and
• at least one S-box must do the same.
Here, the backdoor is precisely the knowledge of the pair ðA,BÞ. This result implies that the
partitions considered for the backdoor belong to the algebraic domain and not to the combi-
natorial one. We are condemned to consider highly structured algebraic objects.
For the candidate S-boxes which make it possible to design such a backdoor, we have
performed a detailed study with respect to their linear and differential tables. We have given
lower bounds on their linear and differential uniformities and we have explained how to
(nearly) achieve them.
The study presented in this book shows that the linear and differential tables of these
backdoor S-boxes are highly structured. Thus, we have proved that our backdoor class
implies necessarily a high algebraic structure. We conjecture that the reverse may be also
true: any algebraic structure can be used to design a backdoor cipher. In terms of backdoor
detectability, we also surmise that it is easy to detect and identify our backdoor from the results
presented in this book.
As future works, we would primarily address the two following issues. First, what would the
results be if we consider dependent round keys? In other words, we would like to consider a
key schedule algorithm which therefore would be part of the backdoor.
Second, we want to explore and formalize exhaustively a criterion which would help either to
design better hidden backdoors or, on the contrary, to evaluate the presence of a potential
backdoor. The first idea of criterion is the following. Let S denote the set of the S-boxes
mapping a linear partition to another linear partition. For any S-box S we define the distance
with respect to S as follows
Partition-Based Trapdoor Ciphers
http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.70420
69
min{# Supp ðτÞjτ∈SðFn2Þ, S ∘ τ∈S} :
This represents the minimal number of images under S we have to modify in order to obtain
an S-box lying in S. In other words, the aim is to have a distance measure to a backdoor S-
box. In Chapter 4, Section 2, we have first considered secret S-boxes mapping linear parti-
tions to another ones. Unfortunately, as mentioned previously, the structure of their linear
and differential tables is likely to betray the existence of a backdoor and can be used to find
it. This is the reason why, we have then modified the S-boxes. These new S-boxes “behave”
similarly to their secret counterparts with high probability. We have published a first-
algorithm proposal [32] denoted BEA-1 (Backdoored Encryption Algorithm version 1) whose
backdoor is based on this property. It operates on 80-bit data blocks using a 120-bit cipher
key and is directly inspired by the AES. The knowledge of the backdoor enables recovery
of the full cipher key in just a few seconds on a laptop computer using only 216 chosen
plaintext blocks.
We also hope to develop our work further to explore the different classes of possible back-
doors. In order to have a clearer view of the research presented in this book, we outline a
tentative starting classification of backdoor techniques. Of course, we hope that other authors
will have a critical cross-view of it and will make it evolve.
• Backdoors based on a single mathematical weakness. The backdoor is essentially put in the core
cryptographic primitives, exploits algebraic or combinatorial properties and is indepen-
dent of the key and the plaintext.
• Backdoors based on the combination of mixed techniques. Here, the backdoor relies on the
combination of several factors: algebraic properties, combinatorial properties, environ-
mental use of the algorithm (for example the nature of the plaintext encoding). Each
aspects being taken separately, it is not possible to see the backdoor. Only the combined
and global view makes it possible to see it, possibly. This approach seems promising in the
light our study of real-life governmental encryption algorithms proposed in a more or less
recent past.
Laval, France
May 26th, 2017
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Appendix
See Figures 1A to 11A.
Figure 1A. The transformation mappings given over the standard basis of F102 .
Figure 2A. The linear mappings over ðF102 Þ
4 associated toMU,MV and the linear mapping PU!V.
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Figure 3A. Specification of the diffusionM and its inverseM1.
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Figure 4A. Specification of the secret S-box S0.
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Figure 5A. Specification of the modified S-box S0.
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Figure 6A. Specification of the secret S-box S1.
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Figure 7A. Specification of the modified S-box S1.
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Figure 8A. Specification of the secret S-box S2.
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Figure 9A. Specification of the modified S-box S2.
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Figure 10A. Specification of the secret S-box S3.
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Figure 11A. Specification of the modified S-box S3.
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